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ABSTRACT 
 During the Mexican War, Americans radically transformed their ideas about Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans.  The Mexican War offered itself up as the first of such interactions 
between the neighboring republics.  The Mexican during the War was met largely with criticism 
from the American public, a criticism aided by the work of the press.  While a vast majority of 
the presses disparaged the Mexican populace on a variety of subjects, not all papers denigrated 
the Mexicans as some inferior population in need of assistance from the United States in order to 
survive and reach a proper level of civilization. Papers such as the Catholic and abolitionist 
presses sought to portray the Mexican in a more positive light.  Analysis of these spheres of 
influence of the various presses offers up a genesis of the Mexican within the American 
imagination.  
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CHAPTER 1. PRELUDE TO CONFLICT: TEXAS, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 
 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans have journeyed a great distance in mainstream 
American racial thought from the 1820s to the present.  For an American history defined largely 
by the existence of black and white racial dichotomies, Mexicans have been the perpetual gray in 
the schema.
1
  Legally they have been considered white, but they more often than not received 
treatment as racial others by white, American society.  The birth of the Mexican people came in 
the 1820s when they had won their freedom from Spain’s control and thus were no longer 
grouped under the banner of Spain.  These neighbors to the south of the United States were a 
relatively unknown entity prior to the Texas Revolution.  Were they the “mongrel race” that the 
United States feared or did they contain vestigial elements of Spanish ancestry?
2
  The inability 
for the whole of Mexico to suppress the Texas revolutionaries led to a questioning of their 
character by the American public.  Racial scientists in the 1830s sought to understand the 
character of the American people and how they had been so successful compared to nations like 
Mexico which seemed to be wrought with failures and instability.
3
  From this point in the 1830s, 
the character of the Mexican in the American imagination began its evolution to the present, 
vacillating between racial others and a part of the mass of “white” Americans.   
 The rise of Anglo-Saxonism in the United States seemed to have reached its apex during 
the 1840s.  These views seemed to find validation after the victory of the United States over 
Mexico.
4
  It was a combination of belief in racial superiority along with a belief in 
exceptionalism and providence that led to such a racialized society in the United States.  Anglo-
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Saxonism during the 1830s and the 1840s came to be a term associated with the good in 
American society, and the Anglo-Saxon was often the foil for the “lesser” people such as 
African-Americans, newly arrived immigrants, or Native Americans.
5
  Anglo-Saxonism entailed 
a belief in the innate superiority of those of descent from the various civilized races in western 
Europe, whether that entailed Anglo-Saxons or one of the Germanic races such as the Teutons.  
Racial science flourished in Europe and in the United States as phrenologists and ethnologists 
alike sought to find scientific proof and a rationale for such superiority over lesser races.
6
 The 
term “Anglo-Saxonism” is not just some post-facto name given to this racial ideology.  The term 
itself had been introduced slowly into the political rhetoric in the 1830s and, by the time of the 
Mexican War, was a common term to be utilized by opponents and proponents alike.
7
  Anglo-
Saxonism fueled the cause of expansion, as some came to believe that the Anglo-Saxon spirit 
could provide territories devoid of such influence with an uplift that would benefit all.  To 
politicians, acts of expansion were not acts of greed, but acts of mercy, saving inferior and weak 
people from being placed under control of a nation less sympathetic than the United States.
8
   
Thus, the term Anglo-Saxonism within this work will represent this belief in an innate 
superiority of the “American people” as defined by mainstream, white society during this time 
and will refer to the idea that the imposition of Anglo-Saxon institutions and people into an area 
previously devoid of these could radically improve the social, economic, and political character 
of the region.  This work will then attempt to explore the ways in which newspapers portrayed 
Mexicans during the Mexican War.   
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The transportation revolution of the 1810s and 1820s opened up a booming newspaper 
business that grabbed the minds of the American populace. Many of the newspapers that began 
in the 1800s were merely instruments for political parties.  By 1822, there were more people 
reading newspapers in the U.S. than any other country.
9
  Newspapers started off with local bases 
of support, but as transportation improved, the reading audience of newspapers grew, and around 
1830, nationally distributed newspapers had arrived.    The sweeping political changes that 
occurred during the 1820s were strengthened by the concurrence of the major shifts in 
transportation and communication.  Ever since the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the political 
electorate had been increasing as property qualifications were lowered.  When the Whig party 
formed in 1834, key framers of Whig ideology were keenly aware of the power of newspapers to 
gain control over the electorate.  The power of newspapers opened up a new degree of political 
participation, and the 1840 election would prove to be the high point of political participation 
and highlight the importance of political newspapers. 
 The 1840 election represented a number of the growing changes in American society 
during this era.  The power of newspapers was showcased to full effect as Martin Van Buren and 
the Democrats utilized it to deliver the first official party platform in the U.S.  At the same time, 
the power of newspapers to create a persona for a president was in full effect on the Whigs side 
of the election.  William Henry Harrison had received early criticism during the election process 
for his age.  A Democratic newspaper writer stated that Harrison was not qualified for the 
position of president and that the nation should “give him a barrel of hard cider, and settle a 
pension of two thousand a year on him, and my word for it, he will sit the remainder of his days 
in his log cabin.”10  The Whigs gravitated to this idea of the log cabin as a symbol of popular 
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appeal and launched the so-called “Log Cabin” campaign.  The imagery of the barrels of ciders 
and the log cabin became central to the public’s identification with Harrison as it depicted him as 
a more common man in his lifestyle than the lifestyle he actually lived.  While the parties 
campaigned, the Whigs were able to capitalize on the continued failing of the U.S. economy after 
the Panic of 1837 to trounce the re-election dreams of Martin Van Buren. 
 The Panic of 1837 proved to be the first panic in the history of the United States that 
brought with it a fierce political debate on which politicians were to blame.  The Panic of 1819 
did not sink the political aspirations of James Monroe in his re-election bid in the 1820 election.  
The Panic of 1819 represented a new occurrence for the U.S. republic.  Unlike the Panic of 1837, 
there was no consensus on who was to blame for the economic turmoil the U.S. entered, and 
thus, Monroe was able to secure a re-election in 1820.
11
  But when the Panic of 1837 hit, the 
Whigs utilized this moment to champion their soft money economics policy and highlighted the 
weaknesses of the hard money economics policy of the Jacksonians.  Martin Van Buren took the 
brunt of the blame, as Whigs mockingly referred to him as “Martin Van Ruin.”  The Whigs had 
noticed the effectiveness of such attacks in the state elections prior to the 1840 presidential 
elections.  Whig politicians had more and more success at the state level, and this success would 
take them into office during the 1840 election.  The power of newspaper and the control over 
information that party newspapers had can be highlighted by the great voter turnout of the 
election.  As the Mexican War approached, while technological developments continued to speed 
up the speed of information, the political purposes for many of the newspapers did not drastically 
change during this time period. 
 The power of the printed press in inspiring the American populace can also be seen in the 
expansionistic fervor that arose in the U.S. in the 1840s under the cloak of “Manifest Destiny.” 
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The expansionistic drive found its best articulation it John O’Sullivan, who, in his article entitled 
“Annexation” for The Democratic Review, coined the term Manifest Destiny in 1845.  To 
O’Sullivan, it was the divine right of the U.S. to expand from sea to sea, and by doing so the U.S. 
could spread its progressive ideas on governance and society to the lesser peoples that inhabited 
the continent.  This concept of a Manifest Destiny helped reignite the nation’s drive for empire to 
levels not seen since the time of Jefferson.  While Jefferson’s idea of an American empire was 
not as overtly filled with ideas of Anglo-Saxonism, there still was a great deal of similarity 
between Jefferson’s ideas and Manifest Destiny.  Under Jefferson’s plan, all those included in 
the empire would be free of political degeneration, while under the new banner of Manifest 
Destiny, those included would be protected from cultural and social degeneration.
12
  While 
Jefferson merely wanted to institute a republican system of government into the West, 
proponents of Manifest Destiny saw the West as a block of clay to be molded politically, 
socially, and economically. This idea of acquiring additional territory proved receptive to many 
elements in society.  While many did not buy the rhetoric of America’s divine destiny to acquire 
the land from coast to coast, many land speculators bought into the increased business that could 
come about with an increase in territory to acquire.  The power of the media to bring to the fore 
an idea of Manifest Destiny placed the Democrats and Whigs on opposite sides of an issue that 
would become the focus of much of the politics of the 1840s.  The newspaper had slowly 
entrenched itself within the minds of many Americans in the 1830s, and by the 1840s was a 
significant source of worldviews for its readers. Thus, this development allows newspapers to be 
a sufficient source for understanding the rhetoric being espoused by vehicles of mass distribution 
during the Mexican War. 
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 The main argument of this paper is broken down along different groupings of 
newspapers, with some chapters focusing on the political newspapers around the nation at this 
time and others on the newspapers of major social movements.  Specifically, the second chapter 
seeks to analyze the political breakdown of Mexican imagery between the Whigs and Democrats.  
The two papers chosen for this section are representative of the ideologies of the two parties 
during the 1840s.  The Democratic Review, as mentioned before, coined the phrase “Manifest 
Destiny,” that would be used to define the reasons behind U.S. hegemony in the 19th century.  
Conversely, the American Whig Review came to be the strongest voice of the Whig Party by the 
1840s.  The third chapter follows a very similar pattern, but additionally incorporates the various 
ways in which sectionalism affects the various newspapers’ understanding of the Mexican people 
throughout the war.  An analysis of sectional newspapers with more regional bases of readers, 
important issues related to the Mexican War emerge, such as the attempted inclusion of the 
Wilmot Proviso.  The fourth chapter seeks to distance itself from the mainstream media and 
analyze how the various social trends and moral reformist political newspapers understood the 
Mexican and the Mexican state.  The 1840s witnessed a great deal of transformation religiously, 
socially, and politically.  The temperance and abolitionist movements grew out of the Second 
Great Awakening, which brought with it a proliferation of religious newspapers.  The religious 
press offers itself up as a microcosm of the political press.  While many of the mainstream and 
Protestant newspapers pointed to the Catholic identity of Mexico as a prominent detractor to 
their character, the minority Catholic press sought to portray Catholicism in a positive light and 
heralded it as the source for political stability in the future for Mexico.   
 7 
 
The construction of race as found in the newspapers represents what historian David 
Brion Davis claimed that “concepts of race influence perception, including self-perception.”13  
For Davis then, it is the ability of the majority to dehumanize the racial others in society that 
proves the most damaging, as by dehumanizing the racial others, the bulk of society cannot 
empathize with them.
14
  No better organ existed at this time than the mainstream press for the 
widespread dissemination of views.  This idea that race was a means of both perception and self-
perception coupled with the attacks on Mexicans by the majority press indicates the intended 
goals of depriving future Mexican-Americans of rights in the sought after territory.  In regard to 
analyzing the printed media, the printed media at this time requires analyzing the ever changing 
nature of certain words found repeatedly within the print media, in this case, Mexicans.  Davis 
refers to this type of analysis as a study of “general cultural patterns” with an emphasis on 
understanding the views of a relatively small group, in this case publishers, and the implicit 
effects on majority culture.
15
  This idea of the minority controlling to some degree the views of 
the larger public drives the discussion on the shaping of race during the 1840s, especially for the 
Mexican people.  Even before the onset of War, most Americans believed Mexicans were 
inferior based only on the brief interaction with a segment of the Mexican population along the 
borderlands.
16
  Other scholars have noted that ethnocentrism has defined the American 
expression of the Mexican character.
17
 
 Overall, much of the Democratic press and even certain Whig newspapers believed that 
the Mexican state and the Mexican citizens were inferior.  The manner in which the newspapers 
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arrived at and constructed this conclusion differs however.  In the South, the newspapers focused 
on Mexican honor and manhood as a foil for the true honor of the South.  Protestant newspapers 
saw the anti-democratic tendencies of Catholicism shining through in Mexico and only through 
conversion could the Mexicans be saved from a future of degeneracy.  Democratic newspapers 
gravitated toward the concept of Manifest Destiny.  For them, it was inherent, God- given 
characteristics that had led to Anglo-Saxon ascendency throughout the world.  For these 
newspapers, a natural racial hierarchy existed which favored Anglo-Saxons and placed them near 
the top.  It was the goal of those on top of the hierarchy to spread their civilizing tendencies to 
the racial others, or, at the very least, to take control of the land being held by these others in the 
world in order to best make use of the resources present.  Even some newspapers had bought into 
the nativism and racial science of the age and discredited Mexicans as people unable to be 
assimilated due to vast racial differences between Mexicans and Anglo-Saxon people.  The few 
newspapers that depicted the Mexican people as semi-civilized or close to equal to the Anglo-
Saxons generally provided more evidence and presented their evidence as contradictory to the 
characterization found in presses denigrating Mexican citizens.  These newspapers sought not to 
disparage the entirety of Mexico and the Mexican people; but rather, they sought to highlight the 
areas of Mexico that were indeed corrupt and worthy of the ire of Americans.  Thus, for many of 
these papers, the military leaders of Mexico came under the most criticism as they believed that 
it was the rule by military leaders that had placed Mexico in such a precarious position.  For 
many Americans, the image of Mexico that most received was one of inferiority to that of the 
Anglo-Saxon populace of the United States.   They were inept proprietors of valuable lands that 
should belong to the United States if the lands were to be utilized to their full potential.  While 
this mainstream narrative fit well within the expansionistic ideology of the president during the 
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war, James K. Polk, the counter-narrative sought to uphold journalistic integrity over 
nationalistic pride and aggrandizement.  These minority presses realized they faced an 
overwhelming mass of disagreement from other presses and they sought to provide more 
complete and factually based descriptions of the Mexican War in ways that attempted to bypass 
nationalistic pride.  As the war came to a conclusion, Americans did not have a universal image 
of Mexicans.  A minority of Americans viewed the Mexican people as relative equals of Anglo 
Saxons.   However, the vast majority of the press depicted the Mexican people as inferior and  
the manner in which the press arrived and depicted the Mexican people as inferior varied 
throughout the nation, as some viewed the Mexican people as inferior based only on their racial 
identity, some on their religious beliefs, and others on the degree of honor in Mexico. 
 The issue of Texas annexation had been a major one in the United States since Texas had 
won its independence from Mexican in 1836.  While many Americans favored immediate 
annexation of Texas, Andrew Jackson saw Texas as a potential political problem for his hand-
picked successor Martin Van Buren and for the nation as a whole.
18
  When it became clear 
during the 1844 election that the issue of expansion would determine the winner, lame-duck 
President John Tyler saw the results as a referenda on the issue of Texas annexation and 
approved the resolution by Congress to annex Texas in the last few days of his presidency.
19
  
With Texas now a part of the United States, a lingering issue from the Texas Revolution 
remained.  The Velasco Agreement had seemingly brought a de facto conclusion to hostilities 
between the Republic of Texas and Mexico.
20
  However, an issue that had not been addressed 
was the boundary between Texas and Mexico.  In the Velasco Agreement, Texas had claimed 
that the boundary between Texas and Mexico was the Rio Grande and not the Nueces River as 
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Mexico understood the boundary to be.  However, there were procedural as well as technical 
concerns with this agreement.  The Velasco Agreement had been signed by Santa Anna under 
duress as he had been forced to sign the treaty after he had been captured after the Battle of San 
Jacinto.  For Santa Anna, in return for the Americans allowing him to live after the battle, 
Mexico would allow Texas to be independent.  When the treaty reached the Mexican 
government, it was denounced immediately.
21
  But even if the document had been a legitimate 
treaty, there were still some facts about the agreement that were never properly fleshed out.  
Mexico had a reasonable belief in the boundary residing at the Nueces River as no Texas 
settlement or military position had ever been established between the Nueces and the Rio 
Grande.  Thus, when the United States now came under control of Texas, it too shared the 
assumption that the Rio Grande was the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico.  The U.S. sent 
delegates to Mexico in attempts not only to clear up the issue of the boundary with Mexico, but 
also in attempts to purchase Mexican landholdings in the present day American Southwest.   
 When the issue seemed to have run out of peaceful, diplomatic solutions, President Polk 
sought to assert U.S. control of the disputed territory between the U.S. and Mexico.  Polk had 
organized the Army of Occupation under General Zachary Taylor.  The first mission for this 
army was to assert U.S. control over the land between the Nueces and Rio Grande.
22
  When 
Taylor’s army arrived in the disputed zone, it met no resistance at first.  However, the presence 
of Taylor’s army in the dispute territory brought with it a backlash from the Mexican forces that 
had been assembled near the boundary as well.  Taylor’s army sought to blockade a part of the 
Rio Grande and thus cut off Mexico’s access to supplies from the north.  Under commonly 
accepted wartime practices in this period, blockading a river in an attempt to cut off supplies or 
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information to a foreign city was considered an act of war.  Mexican General Arista for Mexico 
believed if he attacked Taylor’s position, he could end the conflict quickly and easily, and his 
forces were successful in killing a number of Taylor’s troops north of the Rio Grande in April of 
1846.
23
 When Polk heard the news of the hostilities between Taylor’s army and the army of 
Mexico, he utilized this seeming attack to help push through his expansionistic agenda.
24
  Polk 
had understood that a victory over Mexico would bring with it vast territorial concessions from 
Mexico.  What Polk had lacked throughout much of 1845 was a motive for going to war with 
Mexico.  With the seeming first attack coming from Mexico and within the assumed U.S. 
territory, Polk was able to rally support for war.  When Polk sought to declare war, he did not do 
so in a manner similar to other presidents.  While Congress reserves the right to declare war, for 
Polk the situation seemed different.  Mexico had already attacked the U.S. army and, in his 
understanding, invaded U.S. soil in the process.  Thus, when Polk sent this information to 
Congress, he did not ask for their approval in declaring war, rather he wanted Congress to admit 
that a state of war already existed between Mexico and the U.S.  In taking this action against 
Mexico, many scholars point to Polk as being the first real Commander-in-Chief of the American 
armed forces.
25
   Though Congress approved the measure to move toward war, Polk’s tactics 
along with his expansionistic fervor which preceded it led to the war being called “Mr. Polk’s 
War.”26 
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CHAPTER 2.  POLARIZING FIGURES: MEXICANS IN THE MINDS OF DEMOCRATS 
AND WHIGS 
 With the declaration of war now formal, the U.S. army called forth for volunteers to swell 
the ranks of the so-called “Army of Occupation.”27  While initial volunteers mainly came from 
the South, the North would soon pick up as its share of the volunteers shortly after the war had 
commenced.  Volunteers from the North would not cease to match those of the South until the 
war started to sour in the minds of many in the North.  The first official battle of the war 
highlighted a glaring disparity between the two forces.  At Palo Alto, General Zachary Taylor 
met a contingent of the Mexican army.  While outnumbered, Taylor utilized his more advanced 
artillery to devastate the ranks of the Mexican army from afar.  The technological advantage that 
the U.S. held did not merely include the use of heavy artillery.  The U.S. also utilized guns of 
higher accuracy and durability than those used by the Mexican army, and with the more 
complete training in these technologies, U.S. soldiers held a definitive advantage in all areas of 
battlefield combat.
28
  The disparities were also evident at the economic level.  The U.S. had 
twice the population as Mexico during the 1840s, and the Mexican economy was heavily 
indebted to other nations.
29
  The press would take these systemic differences between the two 
countries and utilize them as evidence for the political rhetoric they espoused.  For the Whigs, 
these differences meant that the U.S. had acted out of sheer arrogance and greed in order to make 
territorial gains at the cost of the weaker Mexico.  The Democrats on the other hand saw these 
differences as originating from the bottom up.  The inadequacy and innate inferiority of the 
Mexican population had created a country of degenerates that were in need of a new power to 
stabilize the country.  The Democrats believed that the U.S. represented this force that could not 
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only save Mexico from the dredges into which it had fallen, but lift up the Mexican populace in a 
manner similar to how the Romans civilized parts of Europe.
30
  Thus, during the Mexican War, 
Democrats justified the war against Mexico by degenerating Mexicans and Mexican civilization, 
while Whigs manifested a multiplicity of views on Mexico and Mexicans that reflected the 
internal divisions over the merits of the war. 
 The U.S. believed a three-pronged strategy would prove to be the most efficient means of 
crushing Mexican resistance to the U.S. forces.  The first of the forces would be commanded by 
General Taylor and would focus on northern Mexico, where the Mexican hero and general Santa 
Anna had stationed much of his troops.  The second aspect of the strategy would have General 
Winfield Scott landing in Vera Cruz and marching toward Mexico City.  This march would seem 
very reminiscent of the march that Hernan Cortez took when he sought to conquer the Aztecs in 
1518.  The U.S. would gravitate toward this repeat of a past military march and herald 
themselves as the new conquistadors.   The last part of the strategy would take place away from 
the Mexican core and feature Lieutenant Colonel John C. Fremont marching to take hold of 
California.  California represented the crown jewel for the acquisition of the Southwest for 
Democratic President James K. Polk.  Polk specifically listed New Mexico and California as key 
areas to bring under U.S. influence during his presidency.
31
  Polk had expected this to be but a 
brief war.  The drastic advantages the U.S. had technologically, economically, and even 
politically seemed too much for Mexico to overcome.  Mexico’s control over California and 
New Mexico had always been comparatively weak, and thus these territories appeared ripe for 
the picking to Polk.  However, there existed one problem for the Polk administration as the war 
commenced. 
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 War heroes were popular icons and symbols for political parties in antebellum America.  
While war heroes held little political power over the presidency after George Washington, the 
rise of Andrew Jackson ignited a political fervor that rallied masses to the Democratic Party.  
The Whigs too recognized the power of war heroes as political figures, as the popular catch 
phrase for the election of 1840 stated “Tippecanoe and Tyler too.”  This slogan heralded 
candidate General William Henry Harrison as the hero of the battle of Tippecanoe for his victory 
over the Shawnee prophet Tenskatawa in 1811. This tactic found great success against then 
incumbent president Martin Van Buren, though the Panic of 1837 did not aid in his bid for re-
election.  As the election of 1848 loomed in the mind of Polk, he recognized a glaring difference 
between Whigs and Democrats in the standing army.  The majority of officers in the army were 
composed of Whigs or those with political leanings in line with Whig thought.  Polk realized that 
a tidy end to the war would validate his expansionist policy, but at the same time, military 
victories also increased the likelihood that the Whigs would discover a new William Henry 
Harrison.  Polk believed that both Taylor and Scott could become Whig rivals, so in order to 
combat the Whig presence in the army, Polk appointed thirteen generals during the course of the 
war.  All the generals that Polk appointed were Democrats, an attempt to create a war hero for 
the Democratic side and stem the influence of Taylor and Scott.
32
  The ability of the press in the 
1840s to get their constituents to buy into their rhetoric and gravitate toward a particular person 
as witnessed by the 1840 election highlighted the increased dangers of popularizing a Whig 
general during the War.  With these expanding means of communications and the increased flow 
of information, the power of the press rose to new heights during the 1840s, and both political 
parties had recognized the power of the press well before the Mexican War had started.  As the 
war progressed, both parties utilized party affiliated newspapers in order to both draw voters to 
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their cause and to shape rhetoric in a way to portray the Mexican War in a way that fit within 
their respective ideology.  Newspapers had been integral parts of the political process since the 
political and technological developments of the 1820s and 1830s. 
 The election of 1824 represented a shift in American politics that brought with it an 
emphasis on democracy defined by almost unanimous white, male suffrage.  Andrew Jackson’s 
unpredictable success served notice to the Democratic Party that mass appeal would be the key 
to political supremacy in the future.  The 1828 election had the highest voter turnout up until that 
time, and the overwhelming success of Jackson in the election brought the concept of popular 
sovereignty into full effect at the national stage.  Jackson’s dedication to the idea of popular 
sovereignty and mass appeal caused a split amongst the then single Democratic Party.  Those 
politicians against what they deemed Jackson’s quasi-democracy hoped to uplift the American 
populace so they could be active participants in the political process, and from these politicians 
the oppositionist Whig party was born.
33
. 
 The Democrats largely backed the idea of Manifest Destiny, considering its origination 
was from a Jacksonian newspaper in New York, but the Whigs were more reluctant to take the 
level of control the Democrats sought to exert over the entire continent.  The Whigs proved more 
reserved in their imperial dreams.  The Whigs may not have wanted the level of absolute control 
that the Democrats sought, but the Whigs would have been foolish to ignore the economic boon 
economic hegemony of the regions held by Mexico could bring to the country as a whole.  For 
the Democrats, their aims were best laid out by the inaugural address of James Polk in 1845.  His 
goals during his presidency were explicit, and he was able to carry out all of them during his one 
term in office.  Polk wanted his administration to acquire Oregon from Great Britain, acquire 
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New Mexico and California from Mexico, reduce the tariff, and establish a permanent treasury.
34
  
Polk understood the responsibilities he undertook as the expansionist candidate of the 1844 
election, and thus he utilized the power of the press to his political advantage in the situation 
with both Oregon and Mexico. 
 Polk’s policy of expansionism had to appeal to both the northern factions of his party as 
well as the southern factions.  For the southern faction, the acquisition of territory from Mexico 
proved to be the key to appeasement, but for the northerners, the acquisition of Oregon from 
Great Britain proved to be the key to uniting the Democratic Party on a patriotic and 
expansionistic level.  The northern Democrats wanted a conclusion to the Oregon question, with 
a hope that most of Oregon would enter the U.S. domain with little incident.  Polk publically 
espoused a policy of uncompromising aggression in the negotiations with Britain, but at the same 
time, Polk was very willing to compromise with Britain privately in order to bring a conclusion 
to the Oregon question.  Conversely, with Mexico, Polk took a very compromising approach 
toward the Mexican administration publicly, yet in actuality, was very uncompromising in 
responding to the list of grievances Mexico noted to the U.S.  These approaches united the party 
at the onset of the war.  By peacefully coming to terms with the acquisition of Oregon, Polk 
ensured that Great Britain would not come to the aid of Mexico during the Mexican War.
35
  
Also, Polk proved much more willing to compromise with Great Britain than with Mexico.  
California held far much more value than the extended boundary of Oregon that would reach up 
in to British Columbia that he initially pushed for in negotiations.  By acquiring the Oregon 
territory with little international backlash, Polk hoped to do the same with Mexico.  The main 
extent of the backlash for his actions toward Mexico came not from Great Britain or another 
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European power; rather it came from the Whig party which found Polk’s actions questionable.  
While the Whigs struggled to critique the actions of a Democratic president, the Democrats 
utilized the war and its continued battlefield successes to confirm the need of the United States to 
acquire and control lands in the American Southwest so as to make better use of the resources 
present there.
36
 
The Democratic Review became the voice of the expansionist Democratic Party in the 
1840s thanks to the work of John O’Sullivan, who coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny” for The 
Democratic Review.  Before the start of the Mexican War, the Democrats believed that only 
through the maintenance of a racial hierarchy could national harmony be maintained in the 
United States.  Abolitionists thus were seen as the threat to American solidarity at the start of the 
Mexican War.
37
  The Mexican War was sparked by the inability of the Mexican government to 
effectively control both the Texans and their native populations, chief among them the 
Comanche.
38
  This notion came to the fore in Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
which stated that since Mexico could not control its indigenous populations, the United States 
had to exert control over the region.
39
  Democrats claimed that territories that had become 
“disintegrated from [Mexico’s] main bulk [should be] converted into a separate state.”40  The 
thought behind this statement was that Mexico’s claim of treaties setting up a formal boundary 
between the U.S. and itself were not permanent, and that the inability to control areas under its 
governance meant that those inhabiting those lands could act independently of Mexico.  The 
Democratic ideology of the 1830s as it related to indigenous populations espoused the idea that a 
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civilized nation should be able to control its native populations.  The Indian Removal Act sought 
to not only clear the land for white settlement, it also contained within it the racial hierarchy that 
the Democrats sought to prop society upon.  For the Democrats, a country must be ruled by a 
white, Anglo-Saxon population if the country is to be considered civilized.  Thus, in order to best 
defend their actions in Mexico, the Democrats sought to discredit the Mexican citizenry by 
noting their “inferiority” and mentioning the positive impact of Anglo-Saxon dominance on the 
American Southwest.  While this focus proved convincing to many Democrats, the Democratic 
message throughout the course of the war lacked a consistent, political explanation for the 
reasons and causes of the war.  For the Democratic cause, support for the war rested on their 
ability to denigrate the Mexican populace in comparison to that of the Anglo-Saxon character of 
the United States. 
 Before the Democrats could focus their energy on the reasons for the war at the social 
level, they had to make clear the Democratic intentions of the war with Mexico as it pertained to 
the national political sphere, even if this opened themselves up to critiques from the Whigs.  
Whigs’ complaints about the war as a Southern plot were hard to ignore.  While the Democrats 
claimed that the U.S. had shown “generous forbearance” toward the actions taken by Mexico, 
they failed to discredit any of the grievances Mexico had with the U.S., merely slighting the list 
as “ridiculous”.41  The justness of the war could not be doubted according to the Democrats.  The 
Democrats believed that surely an unjust war would have had some prominent statesmen arise to 
defend the Mexican nation, though the Democrats claimed that none had championed the cause 
of Mexico.
42
  But even if a politician did attempt to defend Mexico from the U.S. invasion, the 
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Democrats equally claimed that such an action was unpatriotic.
43
   For those fearing the war only 
sought to empower the South on the national political stage, confusion arose with the differing 
stories the Democrats presented.  On one hand, the Democrats stated that the war was not about 
national aggrandizement and that in no way was the inclusion of Texas and other territory a pro-
slavery policy.  However, it was also explicitly stated that the territories to be acquired from 
Mexico were to be made into slave states, as the Southwest was better suited for slavery.
44
  Thus, 
the Democrats created uncertainty about the true intentions of the war.  While the war was a 
product of the pro-expansionist president James Polk, they claimed in certain articles to be 
against territorial gain.  However, it was Polk’s expansionistic policy that garnered him the 
nomination originally from the Democrats.  The inconsistency arises when the Democrats made 
claims about certain regions of the country being more suitable for slavery, at times claiming the 
system fit naturally more in the South and the West, and thus it would be wrong to prohibit the 
practice in the territory.  These inconsistencies would later open up discussion on the true nature 
of the war, but in the 1840s, the focus of the war for the Democrats was not on the political 
maneuverings of the Democratic Party; rather the party focused on how and why the U.S. should 
pursue a policy of Manifest Destiny. 
 By discrediting the Mexican citizenry, the Democrats hoped to show that the acquisition 
of territory that was assumed to follow the war was a natural cession of territory from a lesser 
power to a greater power.  Democrats hearkened back to the Roman Empire to support how this 
process was mutually beneficial, highlighting how Rome had civilized most of Europe.  To the 
Democrats, the acquisition of territory formerly belonging to Mexico would also provide more 
                                                          
43
 “The Mexican Question,” 419. 
44
 “The Wilmot Proviso,” The Democratic Review, 23:123, September, 1848, Making of America Periodical 
Database, 221. 
 20 
 
progress to the people living there than would have been possible under Mexican rule.
45
  The 
movement westwards of American citizens brought the added benefit of “industry [which] has 
raised from the land of its tributary streams, forming the germ of great commerce, which in a few 
short years will find whitening the Pacific with its canvass.”46  Contained also in this is the idea 
that the settlers would purify the racial makeup of the West.  The “Mexican” race was not what 
many in the 19
th
 century would call pure.  Democrats proclaimed that Mexicans possessed 
“mixed and confused blood.”47  The problem of the mixing of blood in the case of the Mexicans 
came not from the Spanish ancestry, but the indigenous ancestry.  While the indigenous racial 
mixing played a factor in the discrimination toward the Mexican populace, Democrats still did 
not hold the Spanish in very high regard as a people.  They seemed to find a problem in the 
Spanish people as all former imperial possessions throughout the Americas had been on a course 
of “degeneration.”48  The inadequacy of the Mexican people, according to the Democrats, led to 
ineffective governance of the territory.  Areas outside the core of Mexico, like California, could 
not be effectively governed.  The acquisition of territory raised questions for the Democrats.  
Acquiring Mexican territory brought with it the Mexican populace living in areas such as New 
Mexico and Texas.  Thus a new problem arose for the Democrats.  As the prospects of 
annexation came closer to fruition, the Democrats had to decide the political status of the 
Mexican populace it would be inheriting in the Southwest.  Democrats opted to exclude 
Mexicans from the American political realm by questioning their ability to operate within a 
republic. 
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 The inability of the Mexican population to effectively govern their territory brought with 
it questions about the Mexican citizenry’s ability to adequately take on the responsibilities as 
voters in the American republic.  The Democrats focused on the inability of Mexican citizens to 
make knowledgeable choices as part of the reason to exclude them from the voting process.
49
  
For the Democrats, giving any degree of power to Mexicans to self-govern was a grave misstep.  
The inability of the Mexican people to contain the Comanche had sealed their fate in the racial 
hierarchy of 1840s America.  The Mexican people were a people to be governed, not a people to 
govern.
50
  However, this idea that the Mexican people needed to be governed did not speak to 
why the U.S. had claims to the territory.  To respond to questions over their motives, Democrats 
championed the U.S. as a beacon of regeneration for the entire continent.  Democrats hoped that 
by focusing on the regenerative effects of U.S. control of Mexican territory they could 
effectively stifle any international critiques made about the war. 
 Democrats sought to create the image of the U.S. as the guiding light for other countries 
to turn to when attempting to reach a higher degree of civilization.  The Democrats crafted the 
notion that it has always been the duty of great countries to look after and nurture lesser 
countries.
51
  Simple contact with an Anglo-Saxon culture brought with it rapid improvement in 
character according to the Democrats.
52
  Effective U.S. control over the region brought with it 
even greater rewards for the people inhabiting the territory.  The U.S. brought with it industry, 
and industry proved to be the gateway to progress.
53
  The U.S. tried to reach out to the 
international community in order to plead its case for the benefits of U.S. annexation of Mexican 
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land.  Democrats cited famous Latin American independence leaders like Simon Bolivar to prove 
that it was the goal of all former colonies of Spain to enter in to the orbit of U.S. control.
54
  
While many revolutions in Latin America looked to the U.S. as its model for independence, there 
was little to imply that they sought acquisition by the U.S.  As the war progressed, the rhetoric of 
the Democratic Party did not change.  In fact, it grew bolder in its assertions of U.S. dominance 
over Mexico. 
 The success of the U.S. military in reaching Mexico City with relative ease gave 
validation to the claims made by the Democratic Party.  The reason for the success, to the 
Democrats, was clear.  The Democratic Review claimed that “race is the key to much that seems 
obscure in the history of nations.” 55  For the U.S., their success came from the “Celt, and 
Roman, and Teutonic, and Norman blood which made them more apt for progress.”56  This blunt 
statement of Anglo-Saxonism highlighted the American supremacist ideology that brought forth 
the concept of Manifest Destiny.  Mexican armies posed little threat to the U.S. as very few 
people residing in Mexico possessed the European ancestry necessary to foment a respectable 
opposition.  With the invasion by the U.S. well underway, the situation in Mexico devolved into 
uncertainty.  A few radical Democrats believed that with Mexico in disarray, all of Mexico 
would be appropriate for the taking.  There existed no pure and progressive institution in all of 
Mexico.  The Democrats noted that even the Catholic Church could no longer provide any form 
of stability as it had long since given away its moral obligation for the seat of political power, 
and the church hierarchy had since become corrupted.
57
  It was the belief amongst the Democrats 
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that there needed to be a strong, civilized, stable authority to control the Mexican populace.
58
  
The two most logical sources of this stemmed from a European monarchy or annexation by the 
U.S.
59
  Democrats. believed that only through control by a civilized nation could Mexico rise up 
from the ranks of the uncivilized.  As the United States detested the monarchical systems of 
Europe, annexation appeared to be the answer to the question over the future of Mexico.  The 
U.S. longed for control over Mexico.  With the seeming regenerative power of U.S. culture and 
the ability to stabilize a country slowly descending in to anarchy, the move toward all Mexico 
seemed logical.  However, the U.S. did not have wholly benevolent reasons for wanting control 
of Mexico.  The economic boon that Mexico could provide to the U.S. was an aspect the 
Democrats could not gloss over in social regenerative language. 
 The territory acquired for the U.S. was not the important issue, rather the acquisition of 
valuable territory proved to be the prerequisite for annexation.  The Democrats identified both a 
social and material value that Mexico could bring to the U.S.  The natural resources in Mexico 
could be put to better use by the U.S., according to the Democrats, thanks to the propensity of the 
U.S. toward commerce, a propensity Mexico lacked.
60
  For the U.S., access to Mexico’s 
resources would provide an overall improvement economically, and thus, the Democrats 
believed that if such economic gain could be had, a greater power would naturally use the 
resources of the lesser power, similar to the way in which a slave and master interacted.
61
  The 
other value provided by Mexico was a vast amount of land that was of relatively little use to the 
United States.  While this seems counter-intuitive to the U.S. criteria for annexation, the land 
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offered itself as a valuable release valve for the South.  While the Democratic Party had not 
wholly become the party of the South, it did have Southern leanings.  The Democratic Party still 
retained some philosophies that Thomas Jefferson made popular, such as the idea of using the 
lands in the West as a place to relegate its unwanted groups in society.  In the mid 1840s, 
abolition was not yet an idea that could rend the nation.  Thus, if abolition were to come about, 
since many Democrats believed there could be no peaceful coexistence of ex-slaves and former 
masters, the Democrats hoped that some of the territory acquired from Mexico could be used as a 
place to discharge former slaves.
62
  The view of race as it related to Mexicans for the Democrats 
never was in doubt throughout the course of the war.  What had been in doubt were the purely 
political reasons behind the war.  The Democrats explanations often proved inconsistent, at times 
claiming the war was not a move to empower the South politically, while at the same time 
attempting to assert the natural tendency of the Southwest toward the slave labor system.  These 
causes fell by the wayside, as the Democrats believed that the Mexican citizenry became in more 
need of U.S. intervention as the war progressed given the continued descent into anarchy in 
Mexico.  The power of Manifest Destiny had been realized in the success of the U.S. in Mexico.  
The only question that remained for the Democrats would be the exact amount of land gained 
from the war.  While these ideas were being debated amongst Democratic circles, the Whigs 
struggled to find a consistent voice to express their dissent with the actions of Polk and his 
administration. 
 Polk’s identification with expansionist policy kept the eyes of the Whigs on his actions in 
the Southwest.  The nature in which hostilities commenced between the U.S. and Mexico, and 
the way in which Polk went about declaring war with Mexico offered itself up to initial critique 
from the Whig press over the Constitutionality of his actions.  The Whigs utilized this beginning 
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of hostilities as their way to bring forth the Whig stance about the war with Mexico.  From this 
political discussion of the nature of the war with Mexico, the Whigs then began to offer up their 
policy about the racial others in society, along with the position that Anglo-Americans held in 
the U.S. 
 The American Whig Review became a central voice for the Whig Party during the 
Mexican War.  Many scholars of this period point to The American Whig Review as the best 
representation the political and social evolutions of the Whig party from the 1830s.
63
  Before the 
official declaration of war, The American Whig Review sought to define the Whig stance toward 
annexation, and at the same time, offer up a glimpse of the paternalistic ideology that defined 
their relationship with racial others.  The crux of the Whig argument against the war came from 
the Whig ideology concerning outbreaks of war.  The Whigs believed that “no war can be 
justifiable which is not […] defensive.”64  However, there seemed to be a logical flaw in this 
understanding as Polk had gone to war only after the attack on American troops in the disputed 
zone between the Nueces and Rio Grande.  To counteract this critique, the Whigs believed that 
the true boundary between Texas and Mexico resided at the Nueces River, as neither Texas nor 
the United States had ever established a military outpost beyond the Nueces River, an area where 
a number of Mexican military outposts existed.  Not only did the Whigs criticize the manner in 
which the administration fabricated a defensive reasoning for war, the Whigs criticized the 
manner in which the war came to be.  Under the Constitution, Congress holds the power to 
declare war; however President Polk merely asked that the Senate recognize a state of war 
existed, seemingly bypassing the presidential bounds of his power.
65
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 Much of the critique of the war came against the Polk administration and the debate over 
the legality and constitutionality of his actions.  To the Whigs, Polk represented a grave threat to 
the concept of a republic the U.S. had hoped to foster since the writing of the Constitution.  
When Polk believed it would be necessary to take the war to the Mexican populace, the Whigs 
were abhorred by the actions the president was making the republic take.
66
  The Whigs, however, 
did not try to portray Mexico as an innocent bystander in the way of Polk’s expansionist 
aspirations.  The Whigs noted that the U.S. citizens suffered greatly during the early years of the 
Mexican republic; however, these injustices were being redressed by the Paredes government in 
Mexico, an effort unfortunately stunted by the economic downturn in the 1840s in Mexico.
67
  
The war did not only represent an internal matter, it also posed problems internationally based on 
the European backlash to the war efforts of the U.S. 
 The war with Mexico did not receive positive press coverage in Europe, a fact that the 
Whigs were more than happy to exploit to point out the “immorality” of U.S. actions in 
Mexico.
68
  The Whigs worried that this idea of Manifest Destiny would destroy the character of 
the U.S. throughout the world by creating a nation driven by lust for territory above all else.  The 
problem stemmed from both President Polk and the manner in which the citizens offered 
themselves up as willing participants in the U.S. efforts along the frontier.  The Whigs believed 
that Polk had gone beyond “any serious dream of any Anglo-American land robber of previous 
times.”69  The expansionistic policies of Polk had already been displayed in Oregon with his 
deceptive politicking with the British.  In fact, Whigs claimed the Mexican War was the 54’40” 
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of the Southwest.
70
   However, the views of Polk and his ambitions during his term in office did 
not account for all the actions during the Mexican War.  The power of an idea like Manifest 
Destiny instilled a great deal of Anglo-Saxon pride amongst the American populace.  However, 
this pride proved to be excessive in many regards, and the Whigs feared, if left unchecked, 
Anglo-Saxonism as defined by Manifest Destiny would lead to the erosion of all the racial others 
in North America.
71
  By this, Whigs feared that the Democrats’ stressed importance of Anglo-
Saxon identity would fundamentally undermine the prospects of other races on the continent. 
The political critique of the war rested heavily on the idea that the Mexican War was unjust and 
that Polk had overstepped his bounds as president for the sake of territorial ambition.  The Whigs 
did not emphasize the racial factors involved in the Mexican War as much as the Democratic 
press, yet, the Whig press still contained much of the racial ideology the Whig party espoused. 
 While the Whigs came to be seen by many as more egalitarian in their stances on other 
races, throughout their politicking, the actions of the Whigs, and especially the Whig 
newspapers, contained traces of Anglo-Saxonism.  In their critique of the war, the Whigs 
believed that it was the “Anglo-Norman” identity of the U.S. that led the U.S. down the path of 
conquest.
72
  Thus, the Whigs believed there was an inherent superiority in those of Anglo-
Norman descent.  In addition to the Whigs beliefs in the character of the U.S., the Whigs 
believed that Mexico was not a nation fit for U.S. aggression.  To them, a war with Mexico was 
nothing more than an “easy conquest” to help bolster the power of the growing “Southern 
Empire.”73  This idea of an easy conquest stemmed from views about the honor of the Mexican 
citizenry, an honor that was lacking amongst the Mexican citizenry according to the Whigs. 
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 Reports coming out about the Mexican citizenry before the Mexican War helped the 
Whigs establish in the minds of the American citizens who exactly their foe was during the war.  
Americans reported that when in the presence of Mexicans, they needed to be on their guard as 
the Mexican soldiers always seemed suspicious.  In the minds of many Americans, Mexicans 
were the evil foil for the United States to play off of during the war.
74
  Many soldiers who 
worked alongside Mexicans claimed that the Mexican soldier proved to be lacking in ability 
compared to U.S. soldiers.  The Comanche in the American Southwest proved to be more than a 
formidable foe than the Mexican soldiers.  The inability of Mexico to suppress the “threat” of the 
Comanche proved to be illuminating for the U.S. in regard to the power of Mexico.  U.S. soldiers 
commented on this same sentiment, noting that Mexican soldiers frequently took credit for the 
doings of the U.S. soldiers in regards to dealing with Comanche raids.
75
  While there was some 
similarities between the South’s concept of honor and Mexico’s stressed importance of 
manhood, many of the soldiers believed that the Mexicans made these claims based on deceitful 
actions and unsubstantiated boasts, thus reflecting the inferiority of their character.
76
  At the start 
of the war the Whigs provided a critique of the racial others in the American Southwest.  
However, the newspapers seemed to find trouble in presenting to its readers a coherent image of 
Mexico and its citizens as the newspaper’s descriptions seemed to criticize the Mexicans as 
inferior at some points, while praising the Mexican state as a world power in different areas. 
 The inability of the Whig party to formulate a consistent, clear image of Mexico for its 
readers created a sense of confusion amongst the readers compared to the relatively clear image 
painted by the Democrats.  The reason for this grappling with the idea of whether Mexico was 
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indeed civilized or not came from the Whig belief on what made a country civilized.  To the 
Whigs, it was Christianity that made a country civilized.  The relationship between Whigs and 
Catholicism was not consistent throughout the entirety of its ranks, and thus the Whig party 
vacillated between the Catholic identity of Mexico being a mark of a civilized and an uncivilized 
people.  Still, the idea of Christian nations going to war seemed to be a disturbing circumstance 
for the Whigs, and thus this led to the belief that Mexico was on the level of other powers in 
Europe.
77
  However, there were also doubts over the abilities of the Mexican army.  The Whigs 
claimed that it would require a five to one ratio in order for the Mexican army to pose a threat to 
the U.S.
78
   When discussing the reason for this lopsided comparison, the Whigs looked to the 
power of religion in inspiring the actions of the U.S. along the frontier.
79
  Implicit in this 
statement was the idea of Protestantism providing empowerment to the U.S. soldiers, while 
Catholicism seemed to be lacking in its ability to galvanize the Mexican citizenry.  Thus, even on 
the issue of religion and its relation to civilization, the Whigs were unable to come to a definitive 
conclusion, citing Mexico’s Christian character as a reason not to go to war, but noting Mexico’s 
Catholic identity as a reason for the U.S. success during combat.  The inability to provide a clear 
image of Mexico in their narrative of the Mexican War proved troubling as the election of 1848 
loomed.  Thus, it would not be on a largely ideological platform that the Whigs would launch 
their campaign, rather this turn of events forced the Whigs to opt for a candidate of mass appeal 
to secure the presidency. The Whigs eventually came to a conclusion of how to portray Mexico 
after a candidate had been chosen for the election of 1848.  In the end, the Whigs favored a view 
of Mexico as inferior to the United States and a belief in the natural inferiority of Mexico. 
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 General Zachary Taylor became the man on whom the Whigs pinned the presidential 
hopes for the election of 1848.  A distinguished war hero during the Mexican War, he hoped to 
arrest the minds of the people as William Henry Harrison had in the 1840 election.  The Whigs 
noted that his bravery and integrity were above reproach, claiming that a person would sooner 
see Taylor retreat from a Mexican army than go against the will of the people.
80
  This description 
of Taylor seemed to speak to his character; it also spoke to the idea that retreating from a 
Mexican army was a mark of failure.  The Whigs avoided critiques that choosing a war hero 
meant they had supported the war by noting the loyalty of Taylor as a soldier.  The Whigs 
emphasized that as president he would be against wars of aggression and wars for the sake of 
conquest only.
81
  While the Whigs seemed to turn toward the idea that the Mexicans were in 
some ways inferior, they retreated away from notions of superiority in many ways toward the 
native populations.  The Comanches at the start of the War were the “Arabs of the West.”82  This 
concept of “Arabs of the West” fit along with the idea of Christian identity being a prerequisite 
for being civilized.  However, the Whigs toward the end of the war backed away from this stance 
when noting the calculated farming techniques of native populations in the newly acquired 
territories.  The Whigs did not deem the native populations in California as civilized as Anglo-
Saxons, rather they believed that further investigation of their cultures was necessary in order to 
make an accurate judgment of their character.
83
  The picture of Mexico and racial others in 
society had experienced drastic change in Whig ideology throughout the course of the war.  
Mexicans had been distrusted at the start of war, were both civilized and inferior toward the 
                                                          
80
 “The Nomination: General Taylor.” The American Whig Review, 8:1, July, 1848, Making of America Periodical 
Database,  2.   
81
 Ibid., 5. 
82
 “Will There be War with Mexico?,” 228.  
83
 “New Mexico and California.” The American Whig Review, 8:5, November, 1848. Making of America Periodical 
Database, 505. 
 31 
 
middle of the war, and, by the election of 1848, Mexicans were once again inferior in the minds 
of the Whigs.  Others, like Native Americans, became more acceptable to the Whig audience.  
While the Comanche had left the Whigs with a sour taste of Native American culture in the 
Southwest, the ingenuity of tribes in New Mexico and California redefined the manner in which 
the Whigs would assess Native Americans.  While there was a great degree of variation over the 
war in regard to racial others for the Whigs, the Democrats did not alter their racial ideology as it 
related to the Mexican War, rather their images of Mexicans just evolved and found verification 
during the course of the war. 
 Going into the election of 1848, the main point of disagreement between the Democrats 
and the Whigs was the status of the lands to be acquired from Mexico.  The Whigs held firm to a 
policy of “No Territory” originally, espoused originally by Henry Clay, in order to avoid any 
possible backlash from what they viewed as a war of aggression.  Unfortunately, this platform, 
along with Clay’s nomination for the Whigs, was short lived as the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo’s signing, which brought a conclusion to the war and added a great deal of territory from 
the Southwest to the U.S. domain, making the policy stance obsolete.  From this point, some 
Whigs adopted a policy of Free Soil.  The concept of Free Soil held that future lands acquired by 
the U.S. should be devoid of slavery.  This policy, however, did not espouse racial equality, 
rather it was part of a bigger program of free labor.
84
  Free Soil had within it the implication that 
the new territory would be reserved for white settlers only.  While the Whigs clamored to find a 
policy about the future of the disputed territory from the Mexican War, the Democrats merely 
followed the policy they held at the start of the war.  There was some dissent however from 
northern Democrats over the status of slavery in the newly acquired territories. 
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 While most Southern Democrats held on to the idea that the Southwest was naturally 
inclined toward the institution of slavery, there was some murmurings during the war about a 
different approach to slavery and expansion amongst northern Democrats.  The key figure in this 
discussion was David Wilmot, a Democratic representative from Pennsylvania.  In 1846, Wilmot 
offered up what has come to be known as the Wilmot Proviso, in which he stated that after the 
war had come to an end, any territories acquired by the U.S. would be devoid of slavery.  While 
his proviso found traction in the House of Representatives, it was filibustered in the Senate.  
Southern Democrats could not ignore entirely the policies proposed by northern Democrats, 
many of whom were loyal followers of Martin Van Buren, and thus they had to strike a middle 
ground.
85
  Lewis Cass established this middle ground when he coined the phrase “popular 
sovereignty” to describe the Democrat’s policy toward the newly acquired territories.  According 
to Cass, slavery could be legal in the newly acquired territories until a point in time arose that the 
legislature would vote on the status of slavery.  With these policies platforms established, the 
parties worked to find the proper candidate to enforce them. 
The results of the election seemed to vindicate the Whig’s decision to place Taylor as 
their candidate.  Taylor was able to acquire more electoral votes in both the North and the South 
compared to Cass.  For Polk, the results of the election realized his fear about who was waging 
the war in Mexico.  His war was largely successful, and all of his policy aims had been 
accomplished during the course of his presidency.  However, it was also his war that brought 
Zachary Taylor’s name to a position of prominence and led to his election in 1848.  It was his 
popularity as a war hero that allowed Taylor to carry key states in the Deep South.  The election 
of 1848 highlighted the power of the Mexican War at the political stage.  It had empowered the 
Whigs to select Taylor in order to cross sectional lines on a war that proved to be a sectional 
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issue.  Clay’s adherence to a policy of No Territory had partially cost him the nomination after 
the passing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  The trends for these policies had been on full 
display through the political newspapers during the Mexican War. 
 The Democratic newspapers had focused on the reasons for the U.S. success during the 
war, a success that empowered Whig generals as national icons, while the Whig newspapers 
were originally cautious of the war, but adhered to the war hero image when Taylor won the 
nomination.  The Democrats’ rhetoric on the inferiority of the Mexican populace spurned on 
concepts such as Manifest Destiny and allowed policies like No Territory to fall by the wayside.  
While the Whigs too were critical of the Mexican populace in a more subtle manner, they were 
also critical of the war’s origins and the aspirations of the Polk administration.  These critiques 
and the subtle mentions of white, racial superiority, the policy of Free Soil proved to be a natural 
extension of the Whig’s understanding of the Mexican populace during the war.  The biggest 
difference between the two parties came in the consistency of their viewpoints.  The Democrats’ 
stance toward Mexico varied very little from the start of hostilities to the signing of the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo.  While a section of northern Democrats arose during the course of the war to 
question the existence of slavery for the new territories, there was never a doubt about the 
addition of new land after the war.  For the Whigs, their biggest problem arose with trying to 
provide a coherent image of Mexico and Mexicans.  While critiques of the Mexican citizenry 
were seldom direct during the Mexican War, Whigs eventually had to opt for such tactics when 
Taylor won the nomination.  Extolling the virtues and character of Taylor came at the expense of 
the Mexican citizenry, a tactic they viewed viable given his popularity in both the North and the 
South. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE TWO MEXICOS: IMAGES OF MEXICO IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH 
 Just as the political sections of the country jockeyed for control over the fate of the 
territories to be added, newspapers across the United States fought to showcase what they 
deemed the correct telling of the Mexican War.   The role of the press during the Mexican War 
varied drastically in the North and South.  Outside of New Orleans, the press in the South played 
a smaller role in shaping the image of Mexico for its readers based on many of the presses’ 
history of disparaging the Mexican population prior to the Mexican War.
86
  The New York 
Herald, the Washington Union, and the New Orleans Picayune contained the most detailed 
coverage of the Mexican War.  The Herald proved to be one of the few papers in the North to 
have more than one correspondent near the warzone, The Union was considered by many to be 
the organ of the Polk administration and thus had access to the latest intelligence from the War, 
and the Picayune proved to be the central hub for news surrounding the Mexican War.
87
  New 
Orleans fielded more correspondents than any other newspaper during the Mexican War, and 
almost every newspaper in the United States received their day to day accounts of the Mexican 
War from The Picayune.  But these newspapers would provide a skewed view of the Mexican 
War, as these three major contributors to the public knowledge of the Mexican War all held 
varying degrees of Democratic leanings.  Horace Greeley’s New York Herald and the Boston 
Daily Advertiser (the largest newspaper in Boston) sought to provide to other major markets a 
different take on the affairs in Mexico.  Likewise, the Charleston Courier represented the heart 
of newspapers in the South, and at the same time, it offered up its own take on the Mexican War. 
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As the Mexican War started to wind down, the negotiations over peace reflected sectional 
strife over the War between the North, South, and West.  The main issue at hand was the status 
of the lands in the present day American Southwest.  While initial discussions centered on 
whether or not territory from Mexico should be ceded to the United States, the discussion 
eventually shifted to the role of slavery in the newly acquired territories.  On this issue, sectional 
alignment more so than political affiliation determined a politician’s stance toward the issue.88  
Northern Democrats and Whigs alike viewed the idea of extending slavery in to the new 
territories as legitimizing the claims of the South about the inclination of the Southwest toward 
slavery.  Conversely, Southern Whigs and Democrats made historical connections to conflicts 
over slavery in the 1830s between Texas and Mexico to assert that the new territories would be 
open to slavery given their geographic location south of the Missouri Compromise Line.
89
  The 
West more often than not followed a line of reasoning similar to that of the South.  Thus, as the 
war came to an end, and discussion over the future of the disputed Mexican territories became 
the central focus in Washington, the different sections of the United States sought to assert their 
case about the role slavery should play.  The North favored an approach that would deny access 
to slavery in the Southwest, or at worst, put the issue of slavery in the new territories to a later 
vote by a state legislature.  The South and most of the West believed that the federal government 
had no power to restrict slavery in the territories to be acquired during the Mexican War, and 
Southern politicians vehemently defended the necessity of slavery to maintain the sectional 
balance in the nation.  In making these claims, the description of Mexicans played a central role 
in justifying the claims.  The North indicated that though the Mexican people were an inferior 
people, they had at least the civility to acknowledge the barbarity of slavery when they abolished 
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it from their territories in 1828.  The South on the other hand blatantly disagreed.  It was the 
Mexican’s lack of an entrepreneurial spirit and inefficient use of both human and mechanical 
capital that had led to the degeneration of Mexican society, a degeneration that could have been 
solved if an economic system similar to that of the South were instated in former territories. 
 The sectional tension present toward the end of the war was not a new manifestation, the 
growing sectional conflict had been growing since the late 1820s, and the 1840s provided a war 
from which the sectional conflict would boil over in to the 1850s.  The core dispute between the 
two sections rested on two main issues: the power of the state and slavery.  The former 
represented the first true break between the North and the South, and the latter became the 
vehicle in which the former was expressed by the South.  The intermingling of the ideas of 
states’ rights and slavery came about due to the conflict in South Carolina over the Tariff of 
Abominations.  The Tariff represented to South an end to the free trade system in which they 
profited so heavily from.  Not only this, the South took exception to the idea that the North’s 
burgeoning business and manufacturing sectors were growing at the expense of the South’s.  
Thus, in South Carolina, politicians began to latch on to the idea of the states being able to 
nullify federal laws they viewed as unconstitutional, a view that stemmed from founding fathers 
such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  These two ideas came together when John C. 
Calhoun and other South Carolina radicals asserted that the use of a tariff for protecting business, 
and not raising revenues, was not only unconstitutional, but it was a direct assault on the slave 
labor system.
90
  For planters in South Carolina, the attacks seemed to flow logically.  The tariff 
reduced the market demand for cotton and rice, and thus the sellers and their capital was 
devalued.  For many of the big plantation owners, over half their capital was tied up in human 
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capital, or slaves.
91
  The crisis over nullification would not destroy the idea of states’ rights and 
slavery being connected, but it would highlight that the rhetoric of South Carolina did not reflect 
the whole of the South, as the move toward nullification did not receive widespread support in 
the South.
92
  However, this did mark a transition in which politicians in the South conducted 
affairs.  The increased expansion of the country opened up more potential conflict over the issue 
of slavery, and the Mexican War proved to be an event that would lead the U.S. toward the path 
of Civil War. 
The ability of James K. Polk to balance the expansion of the United States between the 
territorial wants of the North and the wants of the South helped secure his election in 1844. It 
was these two different, yet similar expansion drives that drove the gap between the North and 
the South further apart.  Polk never claimed that Texas would be reserved for slavery; instead, he 
asserted during his campaign that the expansionist thrusts of the United States, when justified, 
would receive the protection of the U.S. government.
93
  This view appealed to both the North 
and the South.  For Northerners, this meant that Polk would defend the claims of the U.S. in the 
Oregon Territory.
94
  However, there was some apprehension over Polk’s sincerity as his policy 
concerned the Oregon Territory.  Polk combated this uncertainty and stymied fears that he was a 
proponent of a growing slave empire, an idea that stemmed from Polk’s roots as a former slave 
owner in Tennessee, by aggressively negotiating for Oregon.  This doubt made Polk adopt a 
different style of diplomacy for Oregon and Mexico.  For Oregon, Polk assumed a hard-line 
stance of 54’ 40” or Fight! to publicly display his convictions to his political stances.  In private, 
Polk proved to be more conciliatory with Great Britain.  In regard to Mexico, Polk took a 
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completely opposite stance.  While he seemed to go to war with Mexico only out of defense of 
the nation, he had understood that the best way to settle the land claims in the Southwest would 
be to “conquer a peace.”95  As the war shifted in to complete U.S. control, the issue that Polk did 
not address during his campaign came to be the central point of apprehension between the North 
and the South as the negotiations over peace commenced.   
 Breaking down the various politically presses by sections allows a more unique analysis 
than that provided by more nationally distributed newspapers. The Union and the Courier came 
to be the two strongest voices for the South during the Mexican War.  The New Orleans 
Picayune offers a unique example of how the war was portrayed in the South.  New Orleans was 
the source of news as it pertained to the Mexican War.  However, the Picayune does not follow 
the exact same trajectory as that of other papers in the South.  New York will offer itself up as a 
peculiar case given the prominence of two newspapers so diametrically opposed to one another.  
The Herald and the Tribune both offered drastically different tales of the Mexican War, and thus 
these two papers reflected the divided nature of New York’s political climate.  Finally, the 
Northeast will be represented by the Daily Advertiser, a paper which for the better part of the 
19
th
 century worked on monopolizing the newspaper business in Boston.  The common threads 
that these newspapers deal with are the rights of the United States to both Texas and northern 
Mexico, the state of Mexican society during the war, and the role of the United States in the 
future of Mexican territory.  To aid in the discussion on the rights of the United States to 
additional territory, a comparison of the newspaper’s stance toward Oregon and toward Texas 
will help highlight differences in expansionistic policies. 
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The South 
 The Washington Union and the Charleston Courier presented themselves as the most 
dominant voices of the South during the Mexican War.  The Union, edited by Thomas Ritchie, 
was considered by the rest of the country to be Polk’s personal “organ” for transmitting news.  
The paper itself did not even begin publications until May of 1845.  Given this distinction and its 
Democratic leanings, the Union offered itself up as a main distributor of the news to local papers 
in the South.  The Courier did receive a bulk of its news from the Union, but it also received 
news from other papers as well as its own sources in New Orleans, thus allowing for a different 
take on the Mexican War.  While these papers do vary in some respects, for the most part, these 
two papers present a unified Southern approach to understanding the Mexicans.  The Mexicans 
needed to have their territory taken from them due to their corruption and improper use of 
Mexico’s resources, and as the war progressed, the inferiority that these two newspapers 
preached added different dimensions to their criticisms, such as noting the Mexicans want for 
violence.  Annexation to these papers was an inevitability, and one that could not happen as 
quickly as they wanted.  Like the Democratic Review, the views of papers in the South 
intensified their claims of inferiority of the Mexican state and populace as the War progressed, 
given that the victories to the newspapers represented vindication for their claims of Anglo-
Saxon superiority prior to the War. 
 The annexation of Texas first gave insight on to how the South viewed Mexico, and the 
South almost unanimous believed that Mexico could not be trusted.  The two papers described 
the Mexican government as “faithless” and its politicking done in regard to the annexation of 
Texas was filled with “perfidy and bad faith.”96  The main aspect that led to such a corrupt 
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government was due to what they deemed the “tyranny of Santa Anna.”97    Texas, Oregon, all 
these territories would feature better administration under the United States according to many in 
the South.  But Oregon did not receive the importance that northern newspapers placed upon it; 
rather a bulk of the newspaper featured the annexation of Texas, and later the annexation of 
Mexican territory.  As the nation moved closer to war with Mexico, the rationale for going to 
war with Mexico differed slightly between the Courier and the Union.  
  For the Union, the line of reasoning for going to war differed little from the Democratic 
rationale of it being a defensive war, but the Courier added a different element to the mix: race 
war.  South Carolina’s view on race had always been seen as the most radical of the slave 
societies in the United States.  Part of this radicalism stemmed from the political make up of state 
government in South Carolina.  The coastal plantation owners controlled one entire house of the 
state legislature, which gave them increased access to political power.
98
  Combined with 
influential politicians such as John C. Calhoun and Robert Hayne, South Carolina moved to 
defend slavery (given that their state had the highest percentage of slaves compared to the 
general population) as rigidly as possible since the late 1820s.
99
  The fear for the people in South 
Carolina was that Mexicans were going to attempt to create a race war amongst the slave 
population in the South to detract from the fulfillment of the annexation of Texas.  The Courier 
claimed the “yellow Machiavellis of Mexico should grin with satisfaction at the prospect that the 
hordes of renegade blacks were soon to be set in concert with them plotting and consummating 
scenes of war and carnage.”100  The Mexicans had declared any “Anglo-American” institution an 
enemy of the Mexican state, and thus must be eradicated.  This idea that the Mexicans were 
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either working with slaves or working to instigate slaves to violence kindled some of the greatest 
fears of many people in South Carolina.  For the reason of trying to start a race war, and no 
attempt by the government to punish these transgresses, the writers of the Courier hoped to make 
an example of Mexico.  As formal combat was about to begin, there was little doubt in the minds 
of the Courier and the Union that the United States would be triumphant.  The reasons for the 
U.S. triumph rested in certain innate qualities of Anglo Saxons according to these papers. 
 The idea that the United States was destined to control the entire continent was held by 
many in the South. This “Manifest Destiny” of the Anglo-Saxons could also be attributed to the 
blessings Anglo-Saxons believed they had received as a people compared to other races.  The 
Union boldly declared as the War began that “every principle of civilization and every attribute 
of divine power fight on our side.”101  Not only did God favor the American nation, God did not 
bestow courage or any other beneficial quality to the Mexican populace.  Writers for the Union 
claimed that non-Anglo-Saxon races were “satellites destined by Providence to revolve in orbit 
of these three stars of the New World.”102  Thus, the Mexican citizenry was destined to serve as 
second class actors in the coming of the American system, and their lack of courage could do 
little to halt this inevitability.  “The enemy, who has been reported as in readiness to dispute the 
march of Gen. Taylor’s army, seems to have entirely disappeared on his approach” claimed the 
Courier.
103
  Society in the Carolinas and the society of Mexico could not have been more 
different according to the Courier.  While the Courier mockingly referred to the fact that in 
Mexico, statements abounded that “Mexicans know no fear,” they were quick to disparage those 
remarks and instead lift up their own term to define what true honor looked like: “Carolina 
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chivalry.”104  “Carolina chivalry” came to represent a person who fought for what they believed 
in and fought with all their conviction in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, while 
Mexicans were noted to retreat from a fight when the tides turned against them.  While both the 
Courier and the Union agreed on the innate differences between Mexicans and Anglo-Saxons, 
the Courier further pressed that mismanagement of natural resources led the United States to 
take control of areas in Mexico in order to more effectively utilize said resources. 
   The inefficient use of resources by Mexico stunned the writers of the Courier, as the 
Mexicans were not only improperly managing the precious ores found in Mexico, they were also 
letting lands fit for cash crops be used for nothing more than subsistence agriculture.  In an 
article published about the future of Mexico in 1846, the first line of the article read “The Gold 
and silver mines of Mexico continue to produce an immense amount of ore.”105  From this 
premise, the article expanded by noting the potential of the mines if they were controlled by “an 
industrious and enterprising people.”  For the Courier, Mexicans lacked the necessary faculties 
to make use of the gold and silver present within its boundaries.  The lands, thus, should fall 
under control of the United States.  The abundance of rich resources such as precious ores led the 
Courier to claim that “our war with Mexico is the commencement of a new era in the history of 
the Anglo-Saxon people.”106  Not only would the natural resources provide a great boon to the 
U.S. economy, the agricultural gains could be tremendous as well for the slave plantation system 
given the weather seeming favorable to the production of cotton in certain areas of the Mexican 
Cession.
107
  While the Union refrained from mentioning too much about the want of resources in 
its goals for the annexation of further territory, it did back up claimants like that of the Courier.  
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Throughout the war, the actions of the Mexicans toward the United States, according to the 
Union, the “world will see the injustice of demanding the South to concede they have no portion 
of territory obtained.”108  Thus, the Courier noted the South’s impulse toward the lands Mexico 
held before 1845 and the better uses they could be put to, while the Union merely fought for the 
right of the South to make such claims.  Both these ideas asserted that the Mexican way of 
running both an economy and a society were seriously flawed, and had led to an improper 
allocation and utilization of resources within its borders.  In order to remedy the situation, the 
United States needed to transfers its “Anglo-Saxon” institutions and character for entrepreneurial 
behavior in to the former Mexican lands in order to best harness the potential of the land.  While 
the two papers fought to explain why the post-war map should be shifted in favor of the United 
States, the image that these two papers left of Mexico left nothing to be desired as they both 
polished their image of Mexicans as inferior throughout the final stages of war and its resolution. 
 The prospects of Mexico looked dim as the conflict came to a close; what little hope there 
was for Mexico rested in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon conquerors.  Mexico’s hope for 
improvement rested not internally, but externally through integration with the Anglo-Saxon 
people.  Mexico would remain “semi-civilized” until such a time that the “present race is ousted, 
or, by intermixed, with a better blood.”109  Thus, the innate qualities of Mexican citizens, with 
their “mixed’ blood could not raise up Mexico from its present condition, unless the reins of 
power shifted to a better suited people such as the Anglo-Saxons, or there was intermarriage to 
integrate Anglo-Saxon blood into Mexican society.  While this may seem counterintuitive, and 
include the idea of tainting the blood of Anglo-Saxons, claims existed about the scant traces of 
Gothic-related blood in at least a portion of the Mexican citizens, and it was this trace amount 
                                                          
108
 “The Prosecution of War,” Washington Union, 2:218, January 11, 1847, 3. 
109
 “Mexicans were in the habit of propitiating the evil spirits,” Washington Union, 4:9, May 11, 1848, 3. 
 44 
 
that would prove the rationale behind some of the intermarriage.
110
 The imagery that papers like 
the Courier created painted a picture of how the U.S. was the only hope for the Mexican 
populace.  Surveying a battlefield, a reporter described the remains of a Mexican palace used as a 
defensive position as a “gloomy monument of Mexican servility and imbecility [but] the flag of 
the “Stars and Stripes” waves over it.”111  With this picture, there was hope that the American 
people would relieve the Mexican lands of the dreary nature they were destined to inhabit.  
These images by these two papers hoped to describe a Mexico so in need of help that annexation 
of Mexico would prove to be a necessity.  The disagreements would then begin from how much 
territory would need to be annexed by the U.S.  Some like the editors of the Courier and Calhoun 
argued only for taking of lands devoid of Mexican citizenry, while some in the Union and other 
Democrats hoped to incorporate as much territory as possible, some even going as far as to 
propose all of Mexico being annexed.   
 The image of the Mexican citizenry had not wavered from the start of the war for the 
readers of the Courier.  They were the inept keepers of natural resources before the conflict had 
begun, and as the conflict intensified, they were seen as a people lacking in every characteristic 
necessary to be a civilized people.  The only thing that truly changed was the paper’s portrayal of 
Anglo-Saxon charity.  While the beginning of the War, the papers merely claimed that they 
wished to see the resources of Mexico put to better use or threats of an potential race war 
instigated by Mexico, as the war dragged on and came to a conclusion, the press started to talk 
about the hope of rehabilitating the people of Mexico through the introduction of Anglo-Saxon 
control and possible annexation.  When the issue of annexation became the issue for Democrats, 
the issue fragmented members of the party.  Some claimed that the whole of Mexico should be 
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taken, while some like Calhoun felt some reservation at the thought of adding a great deal of 
what they deemed “confused blood” to the American populace.  But underpinning all their 
discussion was the idea that it was the right of the superior races to rule over the inferior races in 
some fashion.
112
 
New Orleans: The News Hub 
 This Mexican War in many ways was a war of the West.  It was fighting for the 
expansion of the United States along its southwestern borders.  New Orleans in particular took 
advantage of its geographic location along the Mississippi to become the definitive news source 
on the Mexican War.
113
  The New Orleans Picayune became the official news source for many 
of the other papers in the United States.  The Picayune employed more field reporters than any 
other paper in the United States.  Edited by F.A. Lumden and George Wilkins Kendall, Lumden 
did the bulk of the editing for the Picayune as Kendall was the most prominent field reporter for 
the Picayune during the Mexican War.  Given their position as the source of the nation’s news 
about the Mexican War, the Picayune presented a less extreme version of events than did the 
South.  Prior to the War, the Picayune believed there was hope for Mexico to redeem itself, with 
the aid of foreign powers such as the United States, but this view shifted drastically after the fall 
of President Herrera from power, and resulted in the Picayune following a similar model to that 
of the Union, but pressed further the point about how the expansion of the United States and 
annexation of parts of Mexico would benefit the country as a whole and the Mexicans as well.  
Also, uniquely among the Picayune, the paper retold and reprinted articles of Mexican 
newspapers, and concluded that the Mexican press was merely a puppet of the corrupt 
government officials. 
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 Prior to the annexation of Texas, the government of President Herrera offered hope to the 
editors of the Picayune about the potential for Mexico to rise in to the ranks of the civilized 
countries of the world.  Jose Joaquin de Herrera began his second term as president of Mexico in 
December of 1844, but he only lasted over a year in office due to being seen as too conciliatory 
given the rise of anti-American sentiment in Mexico.  During this time, the Picayune painted him 
as a potential savior for Mexico since they believed “Herrera [was] dictated by real humanity and 
patriotism.”114  More importantly than his character, his foreign policy meshed well with that of 
the United States.  They believed that the “humane designs of [Herrera’s] government and its 
willingness to listen to the representation of foreign powers” would allow Mexico to rise up from 
its present condition.
115
  Thus, the Picayune worked to showcase Mexico as a country on the 
mend.  While the past governments, especially those of Santa Anna, had been keep Mexico in a 
state of semi-civilization, Herrera’s government’s seemingly pro-U.S. stance offered up hope 
about the regeneration of the Mexican state.  As the issue of Texas annexation passed through 
Congress, the true test of Herrera’s government came to pass.  The Picayune hoped that “if 
Mexico can consolidate and keep together her present confederacy, without looking this side of 
the Rio Grande, she will do well.”116  Imbedded within this statement was the idea that conflict 
could become possible as the Picayune did not doubt that the boundary between the U.S. and 
Mexico had been the same boundary between Texas and Mexico, the Rio Grande, not the Nueces 
River.  However, the honeymoon period for Herrera’s government would not last long in the 
minds of the editors for the Picayune.  The annexation of Texas incited elements in Mexican 
society to re-emerge, such as Santa Anna.  This created chaos and pressure on the Herrera 
government, and forced the Mexican government to become less favorable to American 
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influence in the region.  This change in policy led the Picayune to cease its pro-Herrera rhetoric 
and instead adopt a rhetoric about political corruption abounding on all levels of Mexican 
government. 
 The annexation of Texas proved to be the breaking point for the Herrera government, and 
thus it became the turning point in the detailing of Mexican government for the writers of the 
Picayune as well.  No longer was the Herrera government full of “humanity and patriotism,” 
rather it was now full of political corruption brought on by the seedy politicians who sought to 
take advantage of the Mexican populace.  The editors of the Picayune were astonished to see that 
Mexico seemed to be preparing for war.  To them, “Mexico […] [doesn’t] appear in any manner 
competent” to declare war on the United States.117  Not only did the Picayune believe the 
Mexican state was in such flux that they could not muster up significant force to confront the 
United States, they believed that the war’s intentions reflected an inherent dishonesty amongst 
the major political elements in Mexico.  They believed these political actors “would not hesitate 
a moment about plunging the country in a war […] for the sake of the opportunity it would 
afford to slip some of the money […] into their own pockets.”118  The Picayune hoped to foster 
an image of the Mexican politician as not only being incompetent, but also greedy in ambition.  
Thus, the Picayune believed that it was not the actual people that caused the War that were being 
punished, rather the general populace of Mexico was suffering due to the actions of its political 
leaders.  Even as troops moved closer to the Rio Grande and prepared to take up defensive 
positions against the Army of Occupation, there was little to shake the minds of the editors of the 
Picayune about the chances Mexico had against the American army.  Upon witnessing the camps 
of Mexican soldiers, the Picayune claimed they consisted of “ill-clothed, half-fed, without 
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discipline, unexercised, and poorly commanded” troops.119  As 1845 came to a close, the thought 
of a war with Mexico seemed preposterous given the lack of an army comparable to General 
Taylor’s and a mismanagement of government and political corruption that sapped the country of 
potential effective leadership during the potential crisis.  War, however, would soon arrive, and 
the rationale for such a war mirrored that of the Union with claims of utilizing resources to a 
greater degree and finally receiving compensation for Mexican debts.   
 The U.S. claimed that it had gone to war partially to seek compensation for over 5 million 
dollars worth of Mexican debt that, the U.S. claimed, Mexico had no intention of paying off. The 
Picayune believed that the U.S. had a right to seek compensation through land acquisition from 
Mexico.  By refusing to pay back its debt to the United States, Mexico seemed to the Picayune, 
to attack the standing of the United States in the world.  They claimed that “had [American] 
demands been held by citizens of France or England, they would have long ago have been 
satisfied and secured.”120  Thus, the press emphasized that the claims and grievances of the 
united States did not hold the weight in Mexico as would countries in western Europe.  The 
Picayune believed the forbearance had gone far enough in concern to Mexico as, for the United 
States, “it has ceased to be either magnanimous or merciful to respect the imbecility of the 
Mexican government.”121  But while the loans provided a political reason for the war with 
Mexico, there existed social and economic reasons tied in with beliefs in Mexico’s economic 
backwardness and the power of Manifest Destiny.  As the prospects of war loomed, the Picayune 
discouraged readers from looking upon this conflict with doubt as “we ought to rejoice, as the 
vast and fertile plains of that country must pass into [American] possession.”122   Thus, like the 
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Union, the lands of Mexico represented untapped potential, that the Anglo-Saxon way could put 
to full effect.  But this victory did not just benefit the agricultural community of the United 
States, the Picayune tried to represent most of Mexico as a friend of the United States, and a 
people waiting patiently for annexation.  “All the Mexicans, save the military, would welcome 
the “Star Spangled Banner,”” rang the  Picayune as they tried to establish that the Mexican War 
would be short-lived given the propensity of most of the Mexicans to prefer the orderly and 
efficient government of the U.S. compared to the tyranny they had experienced under the 
constant stream of corrupt leaders.
123
  However, this delusion about the wide-spread acceptance 
that the soldiers would receive proved short-lived, and with this delusion crushed, the Picayune 
entered a brief period in which the character of the Mexican citizens came under heavy criticism.   
 Santa Anna’s popular and polarizing presence in Mexico worried the editors of the 
Picayune, and as the people of Mexico seemed to gravitate toward Santa Anna, the press moved 
toward denigrating the Mexican populace in a similar manner to the way they had done with 
Santa Anna. The biggest fear for the Picayune was if Santa Anna returned to Mexico and used 
his polarizing nature to rally Mexicans to his cause, and unfortunately this came true when Santa 
Anna reneged on a promise to the U.S. government to bring about a peaceful end to the war for 
letting him pass by their blockade to return to Mexico.
124
  This move upset the Picayune, who in 
the past described Santa Anna as having a “career stained with peculation, extortion, tyranny, 
and bloodshed.”125   When the decision was made, they reminded their readers that Santa Anna 
was a man of pure deception, or as they put it “he is a monster of duplicity, and his affect 
reluctance to assume the reins of power at once and openly may be a subterfuge” to break the 
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promises made to the United States.
126
  As support for Santa Anna continued to flow from the 
Mexican people, and a new army had been formed to combat General Taylor, the Picayune 
turned its attention to not just disparaging Santa Anna, but the whole of Mexico as well.  The 
people of Mexico were no longer the people that opened their arms to the United States, they 
were stubborn, half-civilized people that needed to be taught a lesson.  In order to bring about a 
resolution with Mexico, the U.S. must recognize “the impossibility of having a good 
understanding with Mexico before giving her a sound drubbing.”127  However, this attack on the 
Mexican citizens in general was short lived. The Picayune did as few other newspapers did 
during this period, they partially reversed the nature in which they had been characterizing the 
Mexican citizens during the War. 
 On November 5, 1846, the Picayune ran an article that served as the turning point in their 
description of Mexican citizens.  Entitled “Later from Mexico,” the article examined how the 
Picayune had been unfair in its characterization of Mexican citizens and that the Mexican 
populace deserved more credit across the United States.  They identified what they considered a 
problem for the United States during the war, their “national weakness—an overweening vanity 
and self-esteem.”128  Likewise, in regard to the Mexican people, they believed that “every step in 
the progress of the war increased the respect which we should feel for their military qualities.”129  
The resilience of the Mexican army in the face of overwhelming American victories proved to be 
a point in which the Mexican army should be honored.  The article concluded with a hope for the 
Picayune going forward.  “We sincerely hope that we have now been taught to avoid the fatal 
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error of despising our foe.”130  While this did not mean that the Picayune would shift its attention 
to more pro-Mexican viewpoints, it did mean that the attacks on the character of Mexican 
citizens and the Mexican political system would be less severe going forward. 
 The attacks on the Mexican citizenry largely ceased following the printing of the 
aforementioned article in late 1846, and instead, the Picayune sought to highlight the valor and 
the achievements of the U.S. soldiers.  At the Battle of Cerro Gordo, the Picayune described the 
end of the battle as “at the moment when the energy of the heroic Anglo-Saxon valor of our men 
have surmounted their defenses.”131  The only attacks that the Picayune leveled against the 
Mexicans was against their militaristic leaders.  The Picayune hoped that war would continued 
until the “whole, sincere, Mexican federalists race of military tyrants [would be] 
exterminated.”132  While the Picayune left its readers with a hopeful view on the future of 
Mexico, it did note that their existed many destabilizing elements in the country still such as 
rogue groups of bandit and highwaymen that have gone unchecked.  While this narrative had 
dealt with the Mexican populace, the Picayune had unique access to much of the Mexican press 
during the time of the war, which allowed it to offer its own critique in the manner in which the 
Mexican press, especially in Mexico City, was used. 
 The Mexican press offered glimpses of why the U.S. had to go to war and at the same 
time offered insights on to why the war with the United States lingered as long as it did.  The 
Picayune was one of the few newspapers that sought out fluent speakers of Spanish to add to its 
core of writers.
133
  The Picayune analyzed the contents of the Mexican press to determine in 
early 1846 that the state of Mexico was in no condition to oppose Texas annexation.  The editors 
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of the Picayune noted that it was commonplace to look through a Mexican paper and see “a 
report of some robbery or other, committed almost in the face of the public authorities.”134  
While this painted the scene that Mexico was a lawless land, the hope of U.S. intervention did 
not manifest itself through the Mexican press, a fact that seemed to anger the writers of the 
Picayune.  In analyzing Mexican papers, the Picayune was astounded to read articles and not see 
despair, but rather “bitter animosity and hostility characterize every expression of Mexican 
opinion.”135  While the coverage of the Mexican press was absent at times, it did show how the 
Mexican press reflected the feelings and condition of Mexico.  Its newspapers lined with stories 
of crimes indicated that the state of Mexico in early 1846 was one of lawlessness.  However, the 
press did not give in to the American pressure, and instead showed resiliency in the face of U.S. 
victories.  The press became one of the instruments to keep morale up during the time of war, a 
morale that would prove to be the key to the Picayune changing its opinion on the Mexican 
citizens. 
 The Picayune offered a very similar starting trajectory to that of its Southern 
counterparts.  It denounced the instability of the Mexican system and noted how the lands they 
occupied could be put to better use by the efficient American system.  It described the Mexicans 
as imbeciles and in need of a good “drubbing” in order to knock some sense in to them.  
However, unlike the Southern papers, the Picayune departed from this rhetorical style as it noted 
that the Mexico’s continued resistance to the United States was not some mark of shame or 
dishonor, but of strong character.  While Mexicans were not heralded as equal to Anglo-Saxons, 
neither were they put to such disgrace as the Union and the Courier did.  Mexicans may not have 
been the equals to Anglo-Saxons, but they seemed to be strong in their convictions to a cause, 
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and the Picayune held out hope that with the elimination of the military leaders that had 
controlled Mexico for so long, that the Mexican populace could be placed on the road to 
civilization.  Throughout the whole of this change, the Picayune made great use of its geographic 
location to access the Mexican press when possible, and this allowed them to construct the 
Mexican press as both a reflection of Mexican society and a tool of the Mexican government in 
keeping the spirits of its people strong in the face of adversity.  The Picayune accepted its role as 
the center of news for the Mexican War by thoroughly analyzing the situation with Mexico on a 
relatively apolitical basis, given the fact that they came to realize the errors of denigrating the 
Mexican citizens at the cost of journalistic integrity.   
The Curious Case of New York 
 New York offered a different experience in regard to describing the Mexican citizens 
thanks to having two newspapers which expressed drastically different viewpoints.  The New 
York Herald and New York Daily Tribune had established themselves by the 1840s as two of the 
most prominent newspapers in New York, the former of which had a circulation upwards of 
40,000 by the end of the Mexican War.  These two papers offered insights to two drastically 
different political factions.  The Herald edited by James Gordon Bennett followed in the 
footsteps of the Van Buren wing of the Democratic party and pushed an agenda of imperialism in 
its discourse.  Conversely, the Tribune edited by Horace Greeley, served as the base for New 
York Whigs like William H. Seward.
136
  Comparing these two highlights a similar confusion 
found in New York at this time as to just who the Mexican people are compared to the Anglo-
Saxons.  The Tribune highlighted the positive elements of Mexican society, and for the most 
part, avoided critiquing the Mexican system outside of mentioning the faults of some of its 
leaders, while the Herald exuded one of the more radical forms of imperialism found in the 
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press, and did so by denigrating Mexicans while at the same time heralding Anglo-Saxons as the 
true masters of the continent. 
 The two newspapers manifested opposing approaches to the situation with Mexico as it 
involved Texas; the Tribune fought strongly against the annexation of Texas and the possibility 
of future annexation in the Southwest while the Herald believed that the annexation of territory 
in the Southwest was nothing more than divine destiny.  The Tribune echoed the sentiments of 
many when they fought against the annexation of Texas and the border dispute with Mexico.  
They claimed that those actions represented nothing more than Southern ambition and not 
national desire.  They claimed that the “annexation of Texas is to be driven through the House 
[thanks to] the ultra slave faction” and that the whole point of such annexation is the “securing of 
slavery is boldly avowed to be the main object of annexation.”137  Meanwhile, their counterpart 
in the Herald believed that the annexation of Texas was a divine necessity, described as “a 
second step in the great movement of the Anglo-Saxon race on the continent, and will open the 
way for future generations to carry out the idea started by Alexander Hamilton in 1787 […] he 
talked of squinting towards South America.”138  While for the Tribune, annexation proved 
nothing more than the want of a small group of influential plantation owners, the Herald saw 
Texas as the gateway in to the future imperial aspirations in Central and South America.  Oregon 
did not offer any faltering viewpoints from these two papers as the Herald hoped for “quick and 
immediate occupation” of Oregon given Britain’s weak bargaining position in their minds, while 
the Tribune saw Oregon as nothing more than a superfluous addition to the United States 
claiming “England does not need Oregon, neither do we need it.”139  Given these two stances on 
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annexation, the views they created of Mexican citizens in their papers followed a similar model 
to that of the rhetoric of annexation.  The Herald emphasized the innate inferiority of Mexicans 
while the Tribune tried to show the Mexican citizenry as nothing more than a people in need of 
indirect assistance by the United States prior to the war.    
 The Herald and the Tribune held two competing views on the best ways for the United 
States to aid Mexico with its economic stagnation and how the Mexican people fit within the 
racialized order of the United States.  The Tribune believed that indirect aid could benefit 
Mexico.  Investment could prove helpful as Mexico was in need of industrial development.  
When Mexico moved to close off trade with the United States, this act confused the Tribune.  
“Non-intercourse with us […] would be simply annoying to us, and would accomplish little for 
Mexico.”140  Conversely, the Herald believed that the fall of Mexico from power was a foregone 
conclusion.  The hopes of Mexico retaining control of all its territories seemed slim given that 
most of the populace was comprised of a “mongrel race.”  Mexico could only be saved by facing 
the reality that “Anglo-Saxon energy and Anglo-Saxon will, are in the ascendant, and so must 
ever continue.”141  Thus, the Herald concluded that it was fate for the eventual takeover of 
Mexico by the United States.  With these differing ideologies in place, the two papers worked to 
construct the Mexican character in the minds of their readers as the war commenced. 
 The two papers had different beliefs about which elements in Mexican society were 
deemed inferior, while the Tribune believed that the inferiority merely rested in certain 
government officials, the Herald did not hold back in labeling all Mexicans as unreliable, 
greedy, and violent entities in need of defeat in military battles.  The epitaphs the Herald placed 
on the Mexican citizens were numerous.  They were “ignorant, vindictive, and misled,” as well 
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as full of a “violent spirit” that had led the country down the path to total destruction.142  These 
qualities made for an ill-suited republic.  In order for Mexico to withstand its current 
predicament, it must recognize the fact the “the bastard republic of Mexico appears to be in the 
last stages of decline, it is a mere skeleton of a nation, and can only be restored to health by the 
Anglo-Saxon race.”143  This imagery of Mexico as a sick person in need of treatment came to be 
a prominent image for the Herald, and these images of Mexico in such a downtrodden condition 
would continue as the war progressed.  The Herald left Mexico with two options: it would either 
be “anarchy or annexation."144  The Tribune immediately took issue with the manner in which 
the Herald described the Mexicans.  “The Herald can never lose sight of its cardinal maxim that 
all mankind are villains.
145”  To the writers of the Tribune, the Herald had been unfair in its 
treatment of the Mexicans.  At worst, the actions of the Mexicans were no better than that of the 
Americans along the Rio Grande.  At best, the Mexicans had acted at times more civil in its 
negotiations with the U.S. than the U.S. had toward Mexico.  While certain leaders had 
attempted to harness anti-U.S. sentiment, the Tribune did not appreciate that leaders were acting 
“in utter desperation to rush into a forceful conflict” just for the sake of public support.146  While 
government officials were merely seeking support, the officials were at least open in the manner 
in which conflict would begin.  During the initial skirmishes near the Rio Grande, the Tribune 
took issue in the manner in which hostilities erupted.  “Mexico hesitated, inquired, remonstrated, 
forbore, and at least gave formal notice that if our aggressive measures were persisted in, she 
would consider war.”147  The Tribune sought to describe the Mexican government, if not 
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efficient, at least considerate and following in the civilized manner of negotiations.  While the 
Herald believed this war held only positive benefits, the Tribune resisted from giving any 
positives from the loss of life, as the paper itself proved to be against all wars that were not 
defensive.  Instead of denigrating Mexican citizens, the Tribune felt pity for the condition of 
their lives in the current situation. 
 As hostilities commenced, the rhetoric of the two newspapers wavered very little in 
regard to the tone of their writings; however the Herald at least admitted for a brief moment in 
time that maybe they had underestimated the power of the Mexican people and the pedestal on 
which they had placed the Anglo-Saxon race.  Prior to the Battle of Palo Alto, the prospects for 
an American victory did not rest on the military planning or merits of its commanding officers.  
The position General Taylor selected proved to be a precarious one, and the U.S. victory at Palo 
Alto merely added to the growing popularity of General Taylor.  However, before victory had 
been assured, the prospects of a Mexican victory at Palo Alto shook the foundations of the 
beliefs of the Herald.  The easy conquest they had predicted seemed to be a complete 
miscalculation as news of troop positioning reached the Herald.  Upon receiving this news, the 
vanity to which the Picayune spoke of as America’s greatest weakness cropped up in their 
articles.  “What will European nations and particularly England think of us after such an 
exhibition of weakness?”148  The Herald scrambled to rationalize the present situation with 
Mexico.  They rationalized this potential threat in two ways: by placing the blame of General 
Taylor’s troop movements on the national government and by briefly bestowing praise upon 
Mexico.  For the Herald, it seemed obvious that the “imbecility and folly of the government” led 
to General Taylor being placed in such a precarious position.
149
  With war now seemingly 
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inevitable, the war would take place not between the American republic and the “bastard 
republic” of Mexico, rather it would be “the two greatest republics in the world […] at war.”150  
This brief interlude from the Herald’s rhetoric lasted a mere four days, but it marked the only 
departure from its imperialistic rhetoric in the entire war.  Less than a month after the formal 
declaration of war, the war did not commence due to the “imbecility” of the government, rather 
they described the beginning of the war as being “most brilliant opened.”151  This revisionist 
approach to the start of the war marked a return to the traditional rhetoric of the Herald, and once 
again placed the Herald and the Tribune on opposite ends of the spectrum on describing the 
Mexican citizenry. 
 The Tribune believed that the United States should not be attempting to vilify the 
Mexican citizens, instead they should realize the position of Mexico’s citizens during the War 
and sympathize with them, while the Herald believed that nothing Mexico had shown was 
deserving of pity in any degree and that the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons were rectifying the 
wrongs in Mexico.  While other newspapers remarked about the poor condition of the Mexican 
soldiers, they used that to describe the inferiority of the Mexican army.  For the Tribune, the 
ragged nature of the army highlighted the hardships of the Mexican citizens.  “We think not or 
care not that when an army beings to starve, the people must have starved already.”152  The 
manner in which the U.S. responded to the hardships of Mexico showed not the superiority of 
Anglo-Saxons, rather it highlighted their brutality.  The Tribune questioned why Americans 
should “shed the blood of Mexicans because their impoverished, misgoverned, oppressed 
country cannot pay us what she owes.”  They further question “would it be worthwhile to 
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exterminate any other people in order to have [these Anglo-Saxons] expand and multiply.”153  
Thus, the Herald believed that Anglo-Saxons and concepts of Anglo-Saxonism had no better 
right to expand and multiply as any of the other races, specifically the Mexican people in the 
circumstances of the time.  For the Herald, the Mexicans fell further in to ill-repute in their eyes.  
Not only did they lack the qualities of honesty and reliability, the Herald went on to express the 
divine order of how countries should interact while at the same time depriving the Mexican 
citizens of their manhood by openly questioning it in their press.  The ordering of society was 
being put in the right place according to the Herald, as during the current age, as the more 
“civilized” countries seemed “predestined to draw gradually within the circle of their own 
domain the control of the less advanced territories.”154  While repeatedly informing its readers 
about how the world should be ordered by the great powers, the Herald further attacked another 
staple of Mexican honor by questioning their manhood.  Anecdotal stories offered up the perfect 
medium for which the Herald to show the utter lack of any manhood by the Mexican people.  
The Herald told the tale of a woman staying at an American encampment set up across the river 
of a Mexican army, who begged “if the General would give [me] a good strong pair of tongs, [I] 
would wade that river and whip every scoundrel.”155  Not only was it a woman who could 
seemingly easily defeat the Mexican army, it was a woman armed with merely what she could 
grab, thus creating this image of the Mexican army as lacking any sort of manhood and placing 
them in the eyes of the readers, as below that of even women in society.  These two papers 
fought for the proper treatment and imagination of the Mexican citizenry in the minds of New 
Yorkers.  While the Tribune pleaded for signs of sympathy for an oppressed people that were 
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living under harsh conditions, the Herald reminded its reader about the proper ordering of 
society, and at the same time took jabs at traditional elements of Mexican honor by questioning 
their manhood.  As the war came to close, these two papers continued their divergence in the 
descriptions of the future of Mexico. 
 The end of the war revealed several facts to the two different newspapers, the Tribune 
believed that Mexico had every right as a people to continue to exist, and to continue to exist 
independently of the United States, while the Herald believed the results of the war vindicated 
their stance that the Mexicans were in position to be in control of any amount of territory.  The 
Tribune believed the end of the war could not arrive quickly enough.  The War had proven 
nothing for the Tribune; in fact, the continuance of the War seemed to do nothing for the 
Mexican people but cause then needless harm.  “Let us not make our superiority the reason of 
her further misery” implored the Tribune.156  The supremacy of the Anglo-Saxons came under 
severe criticism when the temporary government in New Mexico was overthrown.  This 
overthrow highlighted that the Mexican people were not some weak people; they were a strong, 
independent people who were proud of their identity as Mexicans.  “Can any man pretend 
hereafter to doubt that nine tenths, probably ninety-nine hundredths of the people of New 
Mexico choose to be Mexicans and loath the supremacy of the United States?”157  As the treaty 
between the two countries became more of a reality, the Tribune hoped that the Mexicans would 
be recognized as an independent people, and not be denigrated because the United States 
inspired such hatred of themselves.  As shown in New Mexico, the Tribune highlighted that the 
people of Mexico “choose to be Mexicans, and ought to be allowed to be.”158  The Herald, on the 
other hand, believed that the war had been a proving ground for many of the racial theories that 
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had permeated from before the war.  “The war as sufficiently revealed to the world that the 
singularly mixed race inhabiting the Mexican territory have not […] had any existence as a 
nation.”159  The issue of annexation then cropped up.  The Herald originally believed that most if 
not all of Mexico should be taken, but rationalized the course taken by the federal government 
with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo by stating that the inferiority of the Mexican people might 
be more powerful than the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons.  “Perhaps it is better that we should 
swallow [Mexico] by separate and distinct mouthful, for fear it might injure our own digestive 
organs.”160  These two papers created two lasting images of Mexico for the people of New York.  
The Herald maintained that only through annexation could the Mexican people be saved, while 
the Tribune noted that the Mexican people were a very proud people and had freely chosen to 
remain Mexican, rather than buy in to the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxon superiority and the benefits of 
annexation. 
 These two papers highlighted the political split that appeared in New York during the 
1840s.  Martin Van Buren’s faction in the Democratic party still exerted significant power, while 
the growing Whig factions would eventually be converted to bases for Republican support by the 
mid 1850s.  These two papers thus crafted two largely different narratives about the Mexican 
War.  The Tribune expressed throughout its entire run during the Mexican War that the people of 
Mexico were fiercely independent people, and the conditions under which they lived were due to 
no fault of their own, rather the fault of the leaders that had governed unwisely.  The Herald 
completely disagreed with those sentiments, believing in a racialized order of society with the 
Anglo-Saxons in control of the lesser races of the world.  Despite a brief period in which the 
Herald doubted their own rhetoric, Mexican inferiority and Mexico’s future inferiority were a 
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fact if the United States did not intervene and exert its influence over the territory.  Thus, these 
two papers created two different Mexicos, one its readers should feel sympathy for as it was 
being oppressed both by its own governments and the greedy ambition of the United States, 
while the other Mexico was one of deprivation and inferiority brought on the natural tendencies 
of the “mixed blood” of its people.  
New England 
 The Boston Daily Advertiser spent much of its time in the 19
th
 century consolidating 
other newspapers in Boston in attempts to become the definitive news source in Boston.  It 
succeeded in incorporating the Boston Patriot and Boston Gazette in to the Advertiser.  Edward 
Everett Hale served as editor for this Whig paper during the time of the Mexican War.  The role 
of Mexicans and the views on expansion drastically shifted between 1845 and 1848.  The 
Advertiser believed it was within the right of the United States to take both Texas and Oregon, 
but it shied away from taking any portion of Mexico after the war.  Also, Mexico and the 
Mexican state were seen to be semi-civilized, but as the war concluded and peace talks began, 
the Advertiser portrayed Mexicans as unworthy as being a part of U.S. society, and they did this 
in an attempt to dissuade politicians from incorporating them in to the United States.  The 
growing field of phrenology, or study of the brain to determine differences in races, came to 
affect the Advertiser’s view on Mexicans, as the paper features articles on the subject quite 
frequently, and the movement toward phrenology as a legitimate science had taken off in the 
1820s and 1830s in the United States.
161
  The Advertiser reflected a great portion of northern 
Whig ideology with its opposition to the expansion of the United States after the War, but it did 
place more emphasis on race given its commitment to the expansion of the field of phrenology 
through exposure in its newspaper. 
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 The Advertiser believed that both Oregon and Texas rightfully belonged to the United 
States, and showed little difference in addressing the two cases.  For Texas, the editors believed 
that Texas was “an integral potion of the American Union.”162  For Oregon, they sounded a very 
similar rhetoric, claiming that the claim by the United States to Oregon was without question.
163
  
Unlike the Tribune, the Advertiser saw no problem with the expansion of the United States as 
long as the fighting had already been taken care of in the case of Texas, or the territory could be 
acquired with little problem through peaceful negotiations as with the Oregon territory.  While 
this expansion proved to be acceptable, the possibility of expansion in to Mexico would bring 
with it too many problems to be deemed acceptable by the people of New England.   
 Further expansion of the United States in to Mexico struck the Advertiser as potentially 
dangerous due to the character of the Mexican population.  But the character of the Mexican 
populace was not the only concern.  Before the War had even started, the Advertiser expressed 
concern that the power of the West would grow too powerful in relation to the rest of the country 
if expansion continued unabated.
164
  While this cause began before the course of the war, the 
ideology that dominated at the end of the war was the belief that the Mexican populace would 
prove detrimental to the character of the United States.  The Advertiser showed its true belief on 
the character of the Mexican citizenry in its rationale for not wanting territory from Mexico.  
They claimed that “We want none of [Mexico].  We cannot hold you as a colony, you need only 
read our newspaper to see that we despise you as a sister.  We have territory enough, and we feel 
our people are a great deal better, wise, and stronger than yours.”165  This idea reflected the 
problem with Mexico, while some support was necessary, it should not be long term.  Whigs 
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believed that any attempts to incorporate the bulk of Mexico could potentially spell the end of 
the republican form of government as the inclusion of Mexico would bring with it enhanced 
presidential powers, militarism, and many feared corruption would abound.
166
  While the 
Advertiser believed the Mexicans were unfit to enter in to the domain of the United States, they 
believed that the United States could provide Mexico with at least some temporary stability 
through the use of the army in Mexico.  General Scott seemed up to the task of enforcing martial 
law in the state of Mexico until such a time that the Mexican populace could take control of their 
own country.  In late 1847, Scott was “making preparations […] for retaining military possession 
of the country, which has already been conquered.”167  As soon as acquiring Mexican territory 
had become a possibility, the Advertiser feared that “desire [was outrunning] performance” in 
regard to the want to include Mexican citizens at the cost of American political character.
168
  But 
what caused this great change in the perception of Mexicans throughout the course of war?  In 
Boston, the Advertiser went from a generally optimistic view on expansion to a pure hatred for 
the thought of expanding in to Mexico.  The role of phrenology in convincing the American 
populace about the inferiority of the Mexican people played a substantial part, as well as the 
actions of the political elite in Mexico, which led to anarchy and confusion in the Mexican state, 
both of which made the Whigs belief that not even proper education could make Mexicans 
capable actors in the American political system.
169
  Race increasingly played a more significant 
role in the thinking of the Advertiser as the War progressed. 
 Before hostilities commenced, the Advertiser did not see Mexico as some potential blight 
on the map of the United States.  Even the day to day running of the Mexican government at the 
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beginning of 1845 seemed to be in a right state, as they claimed that the “country seems 
tranquil.”170  However, the opinion started to turn on Mexico when Paredes came in to office.  
He was immediately deemed by the Advertiser as a threat to the character of the Mexican people, 
believing that Paredes was willing to “compromise the honor and dignity o the nation” for his 
own personal gain.
171
  While Paredes did not inspire confidence in the United States about the 
power of the Mexican people, the Mexican army did.  As General Taylor moved toward Palo 
Alto, he found himself in a precarious position as it seemed the Mexican army had a definitive 
advantage if a battle were to ensue.  The Advertiser even believed that in the current position, 
General Taylor’s army will “[fall] into the power of the enemy.”172  However, despite the 
disadvantage on paper, General Taylor proved victorious at Palo Alto and began his advance 
further in to Mexico.  But that victory alone did not convince the Advertiser that the U.S. was 
inherently destined to conquer all of Mexico.  In fact, they espoused an opinion quite the 
opposite.  They stated that they were “surprised to find many parties assuming that the victories 
at the Rio Grande prove the utter inability of the Mexicans to contend with the United States 
troops.”173  In fact, for the better part of the early stages of the War, the Advertiser firmly 
defended Mexico against the United States, claiming they were merely fighting a defensive battle 
at this point.  The reason this “War” had started, rested on the actions of Polk.  It was the 
“impudence, indiscretion, and mismanagement of our own “Executive”” that led the U.S. down 
the road of war.
174
  As 1846 came to a close, and 1847 loomed, the Advertiser began to show a 
different side of Mexico.  No longer was Mexico and Mexicans almost equals to Americans, but 
rather, now they were seen as inferior as losses on the battlefield started to pile up.  Subsequent 
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threats of attacks by the Mexican army were not met with such trepidation as the original 
Mexican army as Palo Alto was seen, rather the battle groups were seen as “not of a very 
imposing or formidable character.”175 The evolution of inferiority had begun in 1846, when the 
government of Paredes came under criticism, and continued as the U.S. began to win battle after 
battle, finally leading to a complete dismissal of the Mexican army as a legitimate enemy.  From 
this, and in to 1847, flowed the language that would tarnish the Mexican people as inferior and 
so completely unlike the United States that they did not warrant inclusion in to the republic. 
 The Advertiser spent the better part of 1847 trying to prove that the Mexican populace 
was unfit for the American system, and they did so by noting the systemic and social inequalities 
that pervaded Mexican society.  The United States in the 1830s and the 1840s prided itself on the 
progress it had made through commercialization and industrialization.  Thus, comparisons of the 
two economies revealed two countries heading in different directions.  The Advertiser claimed 
that “The Mexican nation is not commercial, it is not agricultural, it is not manufacturing, it is 
not mechanical, it is not literary, not religious in any sense.”176  For the United States, there only 
existed two options to overcome the obstacle Mexico had in possible assimilation.  “The Destiny 
of the Indian character is to be overcome only by killing him, or teaching him.”177  While these 
two options stood at the opposite ends of the diplomatic spectrum, the rest of the 1847 brought 
little hope to the possibility of teaching being the solution to erasing the “Indian character” from 
Mexico.  The hope of Mexico gradually fell as fighting intensified despite Mexico City being the 
last major city under Mexican control.  As the siege of Mexico City was just about to begin, the 
Advertiser held that Mexicans in a similar regard to that of African-Americans.  The only 
condition in which the United States should admit Mexicans to the Union, according to the 
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Advertiser, was on a similar level as that of freemen.
178
  After the fall of Mexico City and the 
beginning of peaceful negations, the resounding note that the Advertiser left with its readers was 
one of despair in regard to the condition of Mexico and the Mexican populace.  “Mexicans have 
nothing to hope, from being relieved from the presence of a disciplined army, and they therefore 
prefer the security which results from martial law, under a foreign power, to anarchy which 
would reign.”179  Thus, the limited prospects that the Advertiser bestowed upon the Mexicans 
faded away as the fighting ceased and the move to negotiations commenced.  This coincided 
with a movement in the United States that they should only incorporate only parts of Mexico 
relatively devoid of Mexican citizens, an idea espoused by Polk’s Secretary of State James 
Buchanan.
180
  No longer was there potential for the Mexicans to join the ranks of Western 
societies, rather, the Advertiser relegated their attempts at civilizing a failure, and noted an 
eventual return to semi-barbarous behavior. 
 The Advertiser’s view of Mexican citizens and their country slowly eroded over the 
course of the war.  While they were described as relative equals both before and during the early 
stages of the war, the mounting victories of the Army of Occupation brought with it a criticism 
of both the Mexican government and army.  Originally, the Advertiser focused its attacks on the 
inferiority of the Mexican fighting force in the face of such a well-trained army, and on the 
corrupt manner of Mexican politics.  However, as the fighting did not cease despite the 
continued U.S. success, the Advertiser became worried over the prospects of annexation of more 
of Mexican territory.  Both in attempts to dissuade its readers from supporting the move and due 
to its background in supporting both phrenology and ethnology, the Mexican populace came 
under more and more scrutiny as the war waned.  They were no longer the equals that had the 
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prospects of besting General Taylor at Palo Alto, rather they were no better than the freemen 
living in the United States, and they were compared unfavorably to the success of the United 
States in regards to their economy, leading the Advertiser to conclude that the Mexican people 
were without hope, and could not offer any benefit if annexed by the United States. 
Conclusion 
 The fighting in Mexico was an intense struggle waged on two fronts.  General Taylor’s 
Army of Occupation fought in northern Mexico against the armies of Santa Anna, while General 
Scott made his march from the sea by the way of Vera Cruz.  The march to Mexico City by Scott 
had to pass by Cerro Gordo, one of the last major lines of defenses to the Mexican capital.  The 
Mexican artillery situated a thousand feet higher than the American troops proved to be a great 
obstacle for the army in April of 1847.
181
  Thanks to the work of Robert E. Lee, the U.S. Army 
was able to attack Cerro Gordo from both the front and the rear when Lee discovered a route that 
avoided the major roads leading to the site of battle.  This battle marked the last stand of the 
Mexican army in many respects.  While the Mexican army lost importance after this defeat, the 
Mexican people slowed the advance of Scott toward Mexico City as guerilla assaults continually 
threatened Scott’s supply line.182  By September of the same year, Scott was on the doorstep to 
Mexico City and looked poised to take the capital through any measures.  However, after a brief 
period of bombardment and capture of a few defensive positions, Santa Anna and his remaining 
army believed that retreat would benefit the historical legacy of the capital more than fighting in 
its streets, and thus he retreated north to Guadalupe-Hidalgo.
183
  While the Mexican people 
resisted the imposition of General Scott as the new, be it, temporary leader of Mexico, Scott 
eventually imposed order and began the nine month long occupation of Mexico City.  With their 
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capital occupied by an American general and Santa Anna thrown from grace, the remaining 
members of the Mexican government looked toward negotiations as a means to bring about the 
end of the war. 
 The conflict with Mexico had not only aroused a great deal of differing opinions in 
Mexico, it also created an abundance of such opinions in the American press. Different areas of 
the country relied on different newspapers to tell the story of the Mexican War.  Each newspaper 
approached the discussion of the Mexican citizens in a different manner.  Papers in the South 
believed that the Mexican War represented a validation for the racialized societies in which they 
headed in the South.  The annexation of Texas and additional territories held by Mexico after the 
war  represented the most efficient use of the lands acquired, for the Mexican people lacked 
certain qualities in the newly commercial age to make proper use of the land and its resources.  
New Orleans proved to be the central hub of information for the Mexican War.  The city of New 
Orleans rose to prominence in the realm of the press by dispatching the most correspondents in 
to Mexico, and facilitating their findings to almost every major newspaper in the country.  Papers 
like the Picayune benefitted from this greatly given the fact that their proximity to Texas and 
location on the Mississippi made them an important cog in the recent revolutions in 
communications.  Their narratives seemed to follow that of the South during the early courses of 
the war.  They waged the same battle and created the same image of Mexico as inefficient 
proprietors of lands better suited in American hands.  Unlike the papers in the South, the 
Picayune believed it had acted unfairly in its position as a newspaper when it was used to 
denigrate the people of Mexico.  Instead of searching for reasons for Mexican inferiority in the 
defeats of Mexico, the Picayune believed that Mexicans should at least be given respect for the 
resiliency they had shown in the face of overwhelming, militaristic odds.  The Northeast 
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represented the old vestiges of Federalist thought and the new base of Whig support in the 1840s.  
The Advertiser backed the scientific findings in the fields of phrenology and ethnology in their 
papers, and this slightly distorted the image of Mexican people.  The press did indeed find 
inferiority of Mexican people, in fact, the Advertiser concluded that the inferiority of the 
Mexican populace was so great that it was incompatible with the American system, and they 
vehemently opposed the annexation of any territory that would add a significant portion of 
Mexicans to the American population.  New York represented one of the few areas in the 
country that not only had two newspapers that appealed to mass audiences, but two newspapers 
that differed drastically in the images of Mexicans they sought to portray.  The Herald harnessed 
the energies of Manifest Destiny to push its imperialistic agenda in its newspapers by noting that 
racial order needed to be maintained even in international affairs, while the Tribune believed that 
the Mexicans deserved to be respected as an independent people and should not be vilified, 
rather they Mexicans deserved pity due to the harsh circumstances surrounding their existence 
under previously corrupt and mismanaged government and economies.  All these newspapers 
highlighted how sectional alignment drastically altered the perceptions of the war.  The South 
and the West had an increased interest in the potential of the Southwest, and they paid special 
attention to the war on issues such as slavery.  The North on the other hand, with the exception 
of the Herald, believed that the Mexican people, though they may be determined as inferior, 
were not in such a state that immediate annexation would prove to be the only recourse for 
salvaging the Mexican state. 
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CHAPTER 4. AMERICAN TRANSFORMATION: THE MEXICAN IN THE MINDS  
OF REFORMERS 
 The end of the hostilities with Mexico moved closer to being official when Polk 
dispatched Nicholas Trist to Scott’s army in Mexico City to negotiate a peace..  He was tasked 
with negotiating the acquisition of “Alta California and New Mexico in addition to the Rio 
Grande boundary for Texas.”184  While his initial attempts to broker a treaty for peace proved 
unsuccessful, it did strengthen Polk’s resolve.185  As the United States still dealt with guerilla 
attacks throughout the Mexican countryside, Polk believed that these actions and the further 
costs of maintaining the U.S. army necessitated the acquisition of more territory from Mexico.  
Polk sought to recall Trist in order to better inform him on the terms of the treaty.  Polk stressed 
that pieces of northern Mexico should be acquired while all of California should also fall into 
possession of the United States.
186
  With this knowledge in hand, Trist informed the Mexican 
delegation that a refusal of Trist’s terms would result in harsher penalties being sought.  
Although disobeying the orders of President Polk, Trist’s actions led to the final resolution of 
conflict in Mexico.  Thus, in an attempt to end the war, Trist was able to send to Polk the peace 
agreement that would become the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 
 Before the Mexican War had begun, the United States had gone through a period of 
social transformation.  Moral issues came to the forefront during the early 19
th
 century due to the 
Second Great Awakening.   In response to the seeming distancing of government from 
Christianity, leaders in various religious sects hoped to re-inject morality back into American 
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society.
187
  One of the areas that had plagued mankind according to some was the power of 
alcohol.  Reformers like Lyman Beecher latched onto their “gospel of temperance” in the early 
1820s started to transform the consumption of alcohol into a moral issue.
188
  The temperance 
movement relied heavily on the media to help spread its message on the evils that could be 
brought on by the consumption of strong spirits.  While many religious movements backed the 
cause of temperance, they also attempted to spread and recruit new members by creating a 
religious revival in the United States.  A chief proponent in achieving revivals was Charles 
Grandison Finney.  Finney had tried to inform both the preachers of various sects of Christianity 
and the people who attended his revivals that the grace of God was not something bestowed upon 
someone, rather it was something that a person had to attain for themselves through a personal 
commitment and decision to be a Christian.
189
  These revivals and the spread of Christian 
education helped American religion rebound from the seeming decline during the early years of 
Republic.  Different sects started to tailor their messages based on their constituents.  For 
example, the Catholic Church became one of the few churches to directly reach out to the newly 
arrived immigrant community.
190
  Like moral and social reform movements, certain political 
movements incorporated moral positions into their political rhetoric.  A rising movement in the 
1820s and 1830s, abolitionism became a very polarizing issue for the United States.  
Abolitionists in favor of immediate abolition, people like William Lloyd Garrison, represented a 
threat to Southern society.  Garrison described himself as “an apostle of radical Christian 
liberty.”191  The threat of abolitionism rose to such lengths that President Andrew Jackson had to 
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institute a gag order on the mail system for abolitionist mailings sent to the South.
192
  But as the 
1840s continued on, the movement gained more momentum as writings and speeches from ex-
slaves such as Frederick Douglass gave a more personal testament to the true nature of slavery in 
the South.  Douglass wanted to be a prominent member of the abolitionist movement, but he did 
not want to become merely a symbol of the abolitionist movement, and this led his drive to 
establish his own newspaper.
193
  While never a truly mass movement, the abolitionist movement 
found itself intersected with other moral and social issues such as temperance and women’s 
rights.  These transformations fronted social issues such as Indian Removal, temperance, and 
abolition.  As the Mexican War began, the various newspapers associated with these movements 
saw another brewing moral issue developing given the rise of the Wilmot Proviso and the 
discussion that flowed about the role that Mexicans could play in the future of the American 
republic. 
 While the various moral reform movements sought to purify the nation from within, the 
rise of nativism brought with it attempts to exclude influences from abroad.  The Irish Potato 
Famine of 1845 started a trend of increased immigration from Ireland.  These new Irish 
immigrants were largely Catholic, and their arrival sparked anxiety about the future of the 
laboring people in America.  Nativism was a combination of fear over increased competition for 
wages, stereotyping of newly arrived immigrants, and a distrust of the Roman Catholic faith.
194
  
This anxiety over the increased immigrant of non-Protestants created the idea that immigration 
was a threat to the stability both economically and politically of the United States.  Eventually, 
many who subscribed to this ideology would coalesce during the 1850s and form the Know 
Nothing Party.  The nativist sentiment found throughout the United States in response to 
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immigration was reflected by many in the press during the Mexican War.  There were certain 
characteristics of the Mexican people, even amongst those that were against the war, that led 
them to be incompatible with the American system, and in response to this, those presses did not 
support the annexation of Mexico. 
 The press of the various social movements and religious denominations offered up a 
different view of Mexicans than those found in the more politically driven press.  While many of 
the Protestant religious newspapers held a line of reasoning similar to that of the Democratic 
party concerning Mexicans, the Catholic press rose to the defense of the Mexicans as they 
believed that the Catholic identity of Mexico was not some mark of shame, rather it was their 
identity as Catholics and the Catholic institutions in Mexico that could be the saving grace from 
the demagogues that were in control.
195
  Likewise, the various social movements such as 
abolitionism sought to show that the attacks on Mexicans were unfounded, and that all of 
humanity was equal and deserving of fair treatment.  The newspapers of social movements 
brought with them a relatively radical view of the racial other in Mexico.  Rather than treat them 
as distinctive people, these newspapers emphasized the equality of different races.  These papers 
clashed even with Whig newspapers that condemned the gross denigration of the Mexican 
citizens, as even many Whig newspapers displayed a sort of paternalism regarding the Mexicans 
as a people.
196
  These newspapers offer a different approach to many of the antebellum social 
movements.  While abolitionist movements focused most of their energy on attempts to achieve 
gains for African Americans in bondage, their role in fostering racial equality and acceptance of 
others such as Mexicans cannot be overlooked when attempting to understand the worldview of 
men like William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass.   
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 Although criticized by the editor of The Liberator, William Lloyd Garrison, for being 
relatively silent during the Mexican War, the religious press did indeed speak out on the matter 
of Mexicans and the Mexican War.  While much of the religious press throughout the nation 
condemned Mexico and its Catholic identity, the Catholic press became one of the most prolific 
religious newspapers in regard to the distribution of information about the Mexican War.  Given 
the fact that the Catholic press was fighting against the surging tides of nativism, the Catholic 
press believed it needed to take a stand and defend not only the Catholic identity of Mexicans, 
but also the place for Catholicism within the American republic.  Religious newspapers 
throughout the U.S. largely criticized the Mexicans for their Catholic identity, however the 
Catholic press addressed the issue of Mexican identity and Catholicism to a greater degree than 
that of its other Christian press counterparts.   
 Many of the religious newspapers, be they Baptist, Presbyterian, or otherwise, believed 
that part of the degenerate nature of Mexicans rested in their Catholic identity.  Many of the 
religious newspapers also believed that the conquest of Mexico, like the annexation of Texas, 
was nothing more than the “natural conclusion” to the events taking place in the Southwest.197  
But the support of concepts such as Manifest Destiny did not encapsulate the true understanding 
of Mexicans for these religious newspapers.  In order to make sense out of their Catholic 
neighbors, the religious press sought to attribute the degenerate nature of Mexicans and their 
incompatibility with a system of democracy to the Catholic faith. 
 The Protestant press sought to portray the Mexicans as nothing more than slaves under 
their current, religious system.  To accomplish this task, the religious press sought to highlight all 
the factors of Catholicism that led Mexico down its path of inferiority.  Due to the long 
commitment to Catholicism, the religious press claimed that “the great mass of the people are 
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little more enlightened than were their ancestors in the time of Montezuma.”198  The reason for 
this lack of development and civilization came from the Catholic faith, which papers like the 
Philadelphia based Christian Observer, claimed as the “religion of the Romish Hierarchy has 
never yielded a harvest of intelligence and manly virtue.”199  But there existed a potential cure 
for this condition of the Mexicans.  While the Catholic faith left a road block on the path to 
civilization for Mexico, proper instruction in the Protestant faith could provide the gateway to 
entering the republic.  While many in the religious press supported the war, during the war’s 
conclusion, they stressed that it was “the Truth, not the sword, gives freedom.”200  Coupled with 
this concept, the Protestant press hoped to raise money in order to dispense Bibles written in both 
English and Spanish throughout Mexico.  This concept of “Christianizing’ harkened back to the 
early 18
th
 century, where throughout the English colonies, societies formed in attempts to 
provide Bibles for the literate slave populations in the North American colonies.
201
  The 
Protestant press hoped to impress upon its readers than only through conversion to a Christian 
faith as defined by Protestantism, could the Mexicans be saved both spiritually and politically.   
 While the Protestant press pointed largely to the Catholic Church in Mexico as a point of 
degeneracy for Mexico, the Catholic press believed that the Catholic Church held out the last bits 
of hope for a civilized and stable Mexican state.  Newspapers like the New York Freeman’s 
Journal and Catholic Register based out of New York, sought to defend Catholicism from the 
nativist onslaught it had received not only in the religious press, but also in the mainstream press 
as well.  While the Catholic press did not favor the conquering of Mexico, they did support the 
annexation of Texas.  Like other religious newspapers, they had believed that it was 
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“Providence, in fulfillments of its wise decree […] has peopled the West from the East.”202Like 
many other religious based newspapers such as The Liberator or the North Star, the Catholic 
press did not condone acts of violence.  They believed that “war at any time, upon any account, 
with any one, or upon any provocation, is to be deplored.”203  One reason for their defense of 
peace was fear over the sanctity of Catholic churches in Mexico from plunder.  “we cannot but 
think […] that those “certain institutions” no doubt are churches and conveniently which the 
freebooters of Texas are anxious to plunder.”204  While also worried about the security of the 
churches in Mexico, the Catholic press expressed worry about the growing nativism in the 
United States.  The press indicated that a doctrine such as nativism went against the ideals of the 
United States as it provided a “peculiar exclusiveness.”205  These sentiments left unchecked had 
created an illogical fervor in the United States that had led to war.  “We fear that ‘native’ and 
perhaps religious impulses have had a hand in exciting and promoting hostility to the Mexican 
state.”206  While at one time defending Mexico from the hostile press found predominantly 
throughout the country, the Catholic press also had to make its claim that the Mexican people 
were not some inferior population awaiting takeover by the United States. 
 The Catholic press believed that the mainstream press sought to create an image of 
Mexicans as inferior so as to increase the support for movements for the annexation of all 
Mexican territory, the so-called All Mexico movement.  However, the Catholic press was a little 
more skeptical of the wide sweeping claims of Mexican degeneracy than other presses.  “For our 
part, we do not believe our neighbors of Mexico half as bad and worthless as they are 
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represented.  We do actually think there is some good in Mexico beside gold and silver.”207  The 
Catholic press not only struck at the heart of the attacks on the Mexican character, they also 
poked at the idea  that many only saw the economic advantages of conquering Mexico with their 
rhetoric on the non-material value of Mexico.  The Catholic press at least entertained the thought 
the Mexicans were just as civilized as the Anglo-Saxons that controlled racial policy in the 
United States.  “It is a wide mistake to suppose that the balance of [Mexicans] are not as good, as 
enlightened, and as noble as any other people.”208  Throughout most of its publishing, the 
Catholic press had to contend with the mainstream press and its accounts of Mexican degeneracy 
and inferiority.  Thus, most of the articles attempt to point out that this action of despising the 
enemy during conflict was not necessarily an accurate course of action to take by the press.  
However, the Catholic press did not believe that Mexico was devoid of any corruption or without 
flaws.  Like many Whig papers, the blame for the problems of Mexico came down to those in 
control of Mexico during the 1840s. 
 Like the Whig press, Catholic newspapers sought to show that the problems from Mexico 
stemmed from the control military leaders had over Mexico.  The entire Mexican War, some 
claimed, could be seen as nothing more than the work of a “few military despots” in Mexico.209  
The instability that the mainstream press alluded to stemmed not from some innate quality of 
Mexicans or Catholicism, but rather from the fact that the Mexican government was nothing 
more than the “temporary appendage of some military chieftain.”210  While not condoning a 
furthering of hostilities, the press did hold out hope that the continuation of the war would help 
many in America dispel their conceptions about Mexicans.  “We think the war will prove that the 
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Mexican people have been grievously misrepresented and slandered” claimed the New York 
Freeman’s and Catholic Register.211  While the presence of military leaders continued the march 
of Mexico toward being conquered, the Catholic Church represented the last hope for Mexico in 
the conflict. 
 The Catholic Church was not the embodiment of all things undemocratic, rather it was 
the source of stability and source of hope for an end of hostilities in Mexico.  While the military 
leaders of Mexico did not show any sign of relenting their military endeavors, the press believed 
“there was every reason to hope that, at least the clergy of that country, seeing the ruin that must 
result from so unequal a contest, would at the earliest opportunity use their influence to bring 
around a peaceful adjustment of the unhappy difficulties.”212  While many in the United States 
criticized the actions of the Catholic Church, the Catholic press believed that these criticisms 
came only due to the bias in many Americans’ hearts.  “The Crime of the Church of Mexico 
would be a virtue, if a similar case had occurred in our own country.”213  While many presses left 
the conflict with Mexico with little hope for the future of Mexicans without the outside aid of a 
power like the United States, the Catholic press believed that a Mexico devoid of the military 
leaders that had dominated its young, independent existence would continue to grow and 
prosper.  They believed that the Mexicans “will sure avail [themselves] of all means to avoid an 
evil so full of calamity” ever again.214  Thus, the Catholic press defended the Mexicans as a 
people just as civilized as Anglo-Saxons, but it found itself stemming the tide of nativist 
sentiments in the United States, a tide they found more widespread than their liking. 
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 The biggest challenge the Catholic press faced came from their position as the voice of 
the minority in the United States.  They understood, that while many other Protestant newspapers 
sought to portray the Mexicans as degenerate due to their religion, the truth on the character of 
Mexicans rested on their merits, not their racial or religious background.  They believed that the 
entire conflict with Mexico stemmed from “the worst instincts of theologian odium.”215  While 
the Catholic press pointed to the military leaders intensifying the hostilities and conflict with the 
United States, they also pointed to the Catholic Church as a potential source of peace amidst the 
confusion of the political scene in Mexico  Thus, while a majority of religious newspapers 
commented on the degeneracy brought about through a commitment of the Catholic faith, the 
Catholic press responded to mainstream depictions of Mexicans by being more vocal than their 
Christian counterparts, and noted that the religious affiliation of Mexico should not be a point of 
derision for the Mexican people. 
 Connected to the religious press in many ways, the various social movements such as 
temperance and abolitionism traced their origins to the religious revivals of the early 19
th
 
century.  Perhaps one of the more popular social movements, the temperance movement sought 
not to entirely eradicate the consumption of alcohol, rather the temperance movement hoped to 
change the perception many Americans had about alcohol consumption in order to produce a 
more moral society.  One of the more prominent journals was the Journal of the American 
Temperance Union out of New York.  While many in the temperance movement did not condone 
violence even in the case of war due to fear that wartime conditions increased the chance that 
intemperance would take hold, they did hold some nativist views about which people were more 
prone to intemperance.  Looking at the world landscape prior to the Mexican War, the Journal 
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proclaimed that “very few of our native citizens are now found among our drunken poor.”216  
This statement indicated that the Anglo-Saxons had either through their own actions risen above 
the conditions of the poor that led to the vice of drinking or had reached a degree of morality in 
which they had mastered their reliance on alcohol.  While they did possess certain nativist 
leanings, for the most part, the Journal sought to critique the U.S. soldiers as much as the 
Mexican soldiers.  The thought of the U.S. providing its soldiers with “spirit rations” led them to 
proclaim that “nothing produced insubordination, corruption, vice of every character, brutality, 
and blasphemy, like the distribution of rum rations.”217  This idea spoke to the power of alcohol 
in the minds of those in the temperance movement.  Alcohol could change the morally sound 
Anglo-Saxons into bloodthirsty and ravenous people that could be unleashed on the Mexican 
people.  The stance toward the Mexican people proved contradictory at times due to the 
temperance movement seemingly trying to balance its nativist leanings with its belief that all 
humanity should abstain from alcohol in order to better their lives. 
 The Journal manifested alternative views of Mexico throughout the course of the war.  
The first view coincided with their view about the betterment of humanity, and thus they offered 
sympathetic and humanizing rhetoric for the Mexican people, but at the same time, they were 
quick to point out that there was a moral flaw in the Mexican people as they were taken by the 
vice of alcohol quicker than the Anglo-Saxon soldiers during the War.  Looking back at the 
events of the war and the destruction brought on by the American army as they marched on 
Mexico City, the Journal lamented that “the expenditure of money, the waste of morals, the 
destruction of life, the suffering to be carried by the wounded and the maimed in to the future 
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years, and the desolation of bereaved families are not within human calculation.”218  At the same 
time they offered sadness and disappointment at what they deemed a needless loss of life, they 
also made a subtle criticism of the Mexican people by noting their increased likelihood of giving 
into the vice of alcohol in comparison to others such as the Anglo-Saxons.  During the siege of 
Mexico City, it was noted that the Mexican defenders “became beastly intoxicated, and 
staggering further into the street, fell powerless and prostrate upon the stony surface.”219  This 
description of the Mexican army falling defenseless to the advances of the American army due to 
their excessive consumption of alcohol led to their downfall and the eventual loss of territory to 
the United States.  However, the Americans, though less prone to the evils of alcohol, still fell 
under its influence during the occupation of Mexico City.  The Journal described the situation as 
the “Americans remained quiet masters of [Mexico City], the demon gained an ascendency over 
the army.”220  This “demon” that gained “ascendency” over the American forces was the alcohol 
provided to them both by the army as part of their rations as well as the alcohol available to them 
in Mexico City.  The Journal sought to show that alcohol proved too strong to resist for some 
people such as the Mexicans, but at the same time, the evils of alcohol could seep into any 
peoples’ lives and could produce atrocities.  The Mexican War may have highlighted some 
differences in the susceptibility to intemperance in the Mexicans and Anglo-Saxons, but at the 
same time, the Journal sought to show that suffering was a universal concept and those that were 
victims deserved sympathy regardless of their identification as racial others or enemies during 
times of war.   
 While the temperance movement sought to free Americans from the grips of alcohol, 
abolitionists sought to free slaves from the grips of involuntary servitude.  Their presses, perhaps 
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best represented by The Liberator edited by William Lloyd Garrison, espoused such ideas as 
immediate annexation of slavery both domestically and internationally.  The motto of The 
Liberator reflected its views on the universality of humanity: “Our Country is the World – Our 
Countrymen are all Mankind.”  Alongside The Liberator stood the paper of Frederick Douglass, 
an ex-slave, in 1848, the North Star.  Both these papers attempted to establish that the evils of 
slavery had started overstepping the moral boundaries of the United States and had led them to 
take actions incompatible with a true democratic republic.  For these two papers, the actions 
taken by the U.S. against Mexico deserved no support.  These papers believed that the Mexican 
government in its dealing with the U.S. had acted at worst the same as the United States in its 
dealings with Mexico, or at best, in a manner undeserving of U.S. aggression.  The Mexicans 
were the victims of U.S., or more specifically, slave power politics.  Thus, these two papers, like 
the Catholic press, sought to show that the mainstream press had overemphasized the negative 
actions of the Mexican government and were attempting to create a false image of Mexico as 
some nation of inferior people awaiting salvation from the American system.  
 William Lloyd Garrison’s weekly paper The Liberator sought to go against the grain of 
the popular press, much like the Catholic Press, as it attempted to fight against the unfair 
characterization of the Mexican people during the Mexican War.  In fact, Garrison implored his 
readers to look for actual evidence of Mexican inferiority or Mexican dishonesty.  Garrison 
surmised that a “short investigation will show that if the Mexicans have acted perfidiously 
toward our government (which I deny) they have done it only in retaliation from our 
example.”221  In that same article, Garrison critiqued the “established” notion that Protestantism 
had certain innate advantages over Catholicism when he commented on what the other presses 
hoped would occur in Mexico.  These pressed awaited for the time when the U.S. army would 
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“[eradicate Mexico’s] barbarous religion and [bless] that nation with the pure religion of the 
South.”222  At the same time that this statement attacked the idea of the slave power in the United 
States leading the U.S. down the path toward war with Mexico, it also poked at the idea present 
in the Northeast about nativism and the inherent incompatibility of Catholicism with the 
American economy and political system.  Garrison sought to create a Mexico quite unlike any of 
the other presses.  His Mexico was not one awaiting conquest by the Anglo-Saxons, instead, his 
Mexico was a nation that had the true claim to their own land and only sought to defend 
themselves against the overt acts of aggression conducted by those that trumpeted the superiority 
of Anglo-Saxons.  While negotiations for peace bogged down due to the resentment many in 
Mexico held over the occupation of Mexico City and other Mexican cities, The Liberator saw 
this as a natural reaction to the Americans’ presence in Mexico.  Though a pacifist, Garrison held 
little hope for peace with Mexico until such as time that “every hostile foot is removed from the 
sacred soil of Mexico.”223  It was the Anglo-Saxons’ assuredness of their own superiority that 
had led to such rocky negotiations.  Initial reports of failing to achieve a permanent peace, The 
Liberator claimed, stemmed from “that most excellent representation of ‘Anglo-Saxondom.’”224  
The people of Mexico, to the readers of The Liberator, were not in need of any assistance in 
creating a future for Mexico.  In fact, Garrison found it to be quite the opposite.  He found it 
absurd that the United States had the ability to even improve the political situation in Mexico.  
“We who are keeping in chattel slavery one sixth portion of our own country are the people to 
give [Mexico] liberty?” Garrison questioned.225  In many ways, Garrison created an image of 
Mexico that was superior in some regards to that of the United States.  Garrison blamed the 
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United States for the beginning of duplicitous dealings between the two countries, and he also 
attributed the multiple failed attempts at negotiating a peace on the U.S. delegation operating 
from a position of superiority.  While his message proved similar in some regards to those of the 
Tribune, his characterization of Santa Anna placed him at odds with most of the wartime press. 
 Santa Anna had long been considered the major obstacle to the conquest of Mexico.  His 
popularity, noted by his many terms as president of Mexico, had ingrained within society and 
thus he was the perfect rallying point for Mexico to get behind when he passed through the U.S. 
blockade after promising to bring about an end to the war.  While many in the press, even the 
Catholic press, pointed to the military leaders such as Santa Anna as sowing the seeds of 
despotism and barbarity, Santa Anna deserved veneration and was painted as a war hero in a 
similar nature to that of Zachary Taylor or Winfield Scott.  In one article, Garrison described 
Santa Anna in terms of admiration for his efforts in providing at least some modicum of stability 
to the Mexican nation.  “This Mexican Chief has certain won for himself a high rank in the order 
of greatness to which he aspires.  Few men in history have done as much as he toward rallying 
the energies of a nation.”226  In fact, it seemed that Garrison may have held Santa Anna in higher 
regard to that of the American generals.  He noted that the true weakness of the Mexican army 
came not from some genetically determined defect, but rather from the fact that the Mexican 
army lacked more officers as talented as Santa Anna.
227
  While The Liberator operated 
throughout the course of the entire war, Frederick Douglas’ North Star started its publication just 
as negotiations over the Mexican War began. 
 Though starting his critique of the Mexican War late in the lifespan of the war, Frederick 
Douglas’ North Star created a similar image of Mexico to that of The Liberator.  While many 
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looked at the War as a place for a new generation of leaders to create a reputation for themselves, 
Douglas held the complete opposite view.  The War with Mexico did not contain accolades, 
rather it led to his questioning of “our American brethren, the children of our race, how long will 
they continue to disgrace us?”228  Like Garrison, Douglas believed in the equality of all mankind.  
The loss of life anywhere was a tragedy to be lamented, not something one should base political 
careers around.  Douglas lamented that “Mexico seems a doomed victim to Anglo-Saxon 
cupidity and love of dominion” and that the actions taken in Mexico were not some mistake to be 
learned from, but rather “the slaughter of tens of thousands of the sons and daughters of Mexico 
have rather given edge, than dulness (sic)to our appetite for fiery conflict and plunder.”229  While 
these two presses represented some of the more radical abolitionist papers, their views on the war 
resonated with many other dissatisfied elements in society such as Catholics and recently arrived 
immigrants.  These papers attempted to evaluate the War with Mexico outside any sort of 
nationalistic pride or anti-immigration sentiment that gripped the nation during the 1840s.  Thus, 
their images of Mexico existed outside the popular images being portrayed throughout the 
political presses.  The Liberator even went as far as to lavish praise upon Santa Anna, one of the 
biggest targets for newspapers in terms of negative characterization in the press during the War. 
 Timing proved to be the decisive factor in the ending of hostilities in the Mexican War.  
Negotiations with Santa Anna had proved fruitless, and only after he resigned and was replaced 
by a more than willing to compromise Manuel de la Peña y Peña replaced him as head of the 
Mexican government.
230
  At the same time, as the negotiations threatened to last long in to 1848, 
President Polk faced a limitation on time to negotiate.  Before being inaugurated as president, 
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Polk stated that he only wished to serve one term in office, and his sentiments had not changed 
over the previous four years.  Thus, Polk knew that negotiations had to conclude in fear of Whigs 
resting control of the presidency.  Likewise, the support that Polk had for the War had waned and 
the issue of how much territory to acquire from Mexico had proven divisive.  Free Soilers had 
risen amongst the ranks of the Whig party along with Barnburners in the Democratic Party.
231
  
While the spoils of war as defined by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo did not match the wants 
of Polk in 1848, they did match his wants at the beginning of the war: the U.S. gained control of 
New Mexico and California.
232
  While 1848 marked the formal end of hostilities with Mexico, 
the initial period after hostilities had ceased brought with them new difficulties, especially for 
those Mexicans and Native Americans in New Mexico and California that now answered to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.   
 While the political press dominated the rhetoric over Mexicans with the sheer volume of 
information they output during the Mexican War, other newspapers with deep ties to major 
movements in America during the 1840s had just as an important role in shaping peoples’ views 
on Mexico.  The major religious revivals that took place throughout the early 19
th
 century 
awakened moral and social reform movements that addressed some of the biggest issues facing 
the country and society.  The temperance movement sought to transform the way in which 
Americans viewed alcohol and alcohol consumption.  Abolitionist groups fought for more 
political aims, and certain a more divisive issue in regard to slavery.  These social movements 
took advantage of the cheap capital inputs of producing a newspaper to reach out to their 
members about the relevant news of the day.  The Mexican War intersected with all these social 
movements in various ways  For the religious revivalists, the Catholic identity clashed with the 
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nativist thought that developed in response to the increase in Irish immigration.  The temperance 
movement seemed to believe that certain races were more prone to alcoholic consumption than 
the Anglo-Saxons, and the Mexicans fit within this racial paradigm.  For the abolitionists, the 
Mexican War intersected with a lot of their main concerns.  Many editors such as Garrison and 
Douglas believed that the Mexican War came about due to the unfair influence the slave powers 
had over the U.S. government.  Likewise, the actions of the political press in denigrating the 
Mexican people provided another example of the undemocratic nature of Anglo-Saxon 
dominated U.S. society during this time.   All these newspapers not only created their own image 
of Mexico and Mexicans, they also related it directly to the political or social issue they 
espoused. 
 The Mexican War brought with it a variety of images of Mexico.  While the presses of 
various social and political movements did not have the mass circulation that a paper such as the 
Herald might have, they still fought for the minds of their readers.  The majority of the religious 
press attempted to paint the Mexican populace as nothing more than slaves to the hierarchical 
system of Roman Catholicism.  They attributed the lack of civilization to the Mexican’s faith and 
attempted to provide potential remedies to the situation through the conversion of Mexicans to a 
Protestant faith.   The Catholic press attempted to fight against the current of anti-Catholic 
rhetoric in its defense not only of Mexico, but of the Catholic faith as well.  The Catholic faith 
was not the source of destruction for Mexican independence, rather it was to be the salvation of 
the Mexican people.  The Catholic Church represented the last source of stability for Mexico 
according to the Catholic press.  Other movements such as temperance connected to the religious 
awakenings held views similar to the majority of Christians in the United States.  The flaws in 
the Mexican character became clearer during times of war.  They mentioned that the Mexican 
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army was quicker to succumb to the dangers of alcohol than their American counterparts.  The 
true radicals in fostering an image of Mexico seemingly incompatible with American racial 
ideology at this time were the abolitionists.  Men like Garrison and Douglas not only attacked the 
actions of the United States in Mexico, they sought to portray Mexico in many ways superior to 
that of the United States.  It was the shady politicking of U.S. diplomats that had fostered perfidy 
in diplomatic talks between the U.S. and Mexico.  Likewise, the people of Mexico did not need 
to be liberated, especially by a country that had a significant portion of its inhabitants enslaved.  
Like the Catholic press, abolitionists sought to show that the actions taken by Mexico should not 
be seen as the works of evil or degenerate people, but rather they should be seen in the light of a 
people with incredible loyalty to their nation, actions that would receive copious amounts of 
praise if the actors had resided in the United States and supported the U.S. cause during the War.  
These presses worked to incorporate the changing nature of the American nation while at the 
same time managing the changing social tides in the U.S. at this time.  Thus, the majority of the 
religious press and the temperance movement in particular worked to foster an image of Mexico 
as deficient either do to certain genetic flaws or to their religious affiliations.  Conversely, the 
abolitionist and Catholic press attempted to stem the tide of nationalistic rhetoric regarding 
depictions of Mexicans and thus urged their readers to reconsider and evaluate the character of 
Mexicans only on their actions devoid of any personal attachment to the United States and 
without blindly subscribing to the rhetoric of a particular party and/or movement.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE MEXICAN IMAGE CODIFIED: THE TREATY OF  
GUADALUPE-HIDALGO 
 The end of the war and the negotiations that were conducted reflected the viewpoint 
many of the presses sought to establish throughout the war: that the Mexican people were 
inferior and it was their inferiority that partly led to the hostilities between the United States and 
Mexico.  Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo stated that since Mexico had shown an 
inability to control the indigenous populations in Mexico and throughout its landholdings in the 
Southwest, that the United States reserved the right to intervene in Mexico if unchecked, 
indigenous activities brought about ill-results for Americans in any manner.
233
  The inclusion of 
this section indicated that the Mexican people did not have the control over their indigenous 
population in a similar way that the U.S. did.  Coming off of the Indian Removal of the 1830s 
and the Second Seminole War, the United States believed it had finally achieved the level of 
control of the various Native American tribes within its boundaries that it required in order to 
best serve the nation as a whole.  This idea that a civilized country could control its indigenous 
populations also led to the characterization of Mexico as inferior and led many in the U.S. to 
declare that the War would be a short and effortless spectacle.
234
  At the same time, the inclusion 
of a provision such as this would see similar usage in other U.S. dealings with countries in Latin 
America. 
 Likewise, the actions of newly arrived U.S. settlers into regions formerly owned by 
Mexico brought with it hardships for the remaining Mexican population.  While the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo had initially indicated that the land rights of those now residing in the 
borders of the United States would be honored, settlers in California and New Mexico were 
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quick to dispossess the Mexicans living there of any they were interested in.  Thus, while a 
multitude of images of Mexico had existed, the policy that the U.S. and the people of the United 
States had taken reflected the views of the Democratic press.  The Mexican people had proven 
they were unfit to harness the resources and potential of the lands in Mexico, and thus, their land 
rights were superficial at best in the minds of those settling in the Southwest.  Similarly, the U.S. 
sought to restrict the access to voting for the Mexican people in the newly established territories, 
thus insuring that the political landscape of the Southwest would flow along Anglo-Saxon 
lines.
235
  The Mexican people had seemingly been thrust to the lower rungs of the racial ladder 
that made up U.S. society during this period, and the Mexican people would be forced to adapt to 
the new system of power they had found themselves in. 
 While Mexicans and Mexican-Americans struggled to re-construct their lives from prior 
to the War, the Mexican-American War created a sectional rift in American society that would 
extend and define the political and social landscape of the 1850s.  The Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo had been passed without the inclusion of the Wilmot Proviso.  The issue of the Wilmot 
Proviso had proven that the sectional issues such as slavery ran deeper than political affiliation.  
Even the signing of the Wilmot Proviso reflected this sentiment as most northerners opposed the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo as it seemed to benefit the South more than the North.
236
  During 
the debate over the treaty, former President John Quincy Adams, a former proponent of No Soil, 
collapsed after giving a speech railing against the treaty and the war and he would later die from 
this event.  But the deeper divide was yet looming.  The discovery of gold in California in 1848 
and its announcement by President Polk in 1849 sparked a mass migration to California in search 
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for quick economic gains from mining the readily available placer gold.
237
  Quickly, California 
was eligible for statehood and the question again arose whether or not California would be free 
or slave.  The debates over California and the formation of the “Compromise” of 1850 led to a 
back in forth in the Senate over the merits of slavery and other sectional issues.  William Seward 
and John C. Calhoun famously attacked each other’s views on the issue of slavery and 
sectionalism and set the tone for the sectionalism that would develop throughout the 1850.
238
  
There had been a fear during the war, that the acquisition of territory held by Mexico would be 
nothing more than a poison that would slowly weaken the United States.  The Mexican War has 
often been killed a “rehearsal” for the events of the Civil War, and much of the sectional tension 
that built during the 1850s can be traced to the Mexican War.
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 The Mexican character throughout the War underwent drastic changes in some presses, 
and others, the character the newspaper sought to espouse simply evolved or found validation for 
the paper’s original claim prior to hostilities.  The Democratic press focused on ideas of innate 
racial hierarchies, innate and predestined expansion of the United States, and a belief in the 
civilizing powers of the Anglo-Saxon presence in Mexico.  Some Whig newspapers agreed with 
this sentiment, mainly those in Boston, as these papers had been chief supporters of the racial 
sciences of phrenology and ethnology.  While some Whig papers such as the New York Tribune 
sought to present a counter-narrative to that of the Democratic press, their views were amongst 
the minority.  Papers like the Tribune, The Liberator, and the Catholic press sought to portray 
Mexico in a vastly different light.  Mexico was not some degenerate people only fit for 
subservience within the sphere of influence of the United States.  Rather, the people of Mexico 
were a resilient people that were imbued with the same principles of civility and intelligence that  
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that the people in the United States were as described by those espousing Anglo-Saxonism.  
Regionally, only the North contained a significant degree of disunity in its characterization of 
Mexican people.  Chief among them was New York with its conflicting presses.  New Orleans 
also presented itself as a unique case about the press during the war.  While it was the central hub 
of information throughout the War, papers like the New Orleans Picayune perhaps underwent the 
greatest degree of change of any of the wartime presses.  While it followed a similar trajectory of 
that of the Democratic presses during the early stages of the war, midway through the conflict, 
the Picayune changed its stance on its characterization of the Mexican people and sought to 
portray them instead in a manner devoid of nationalistic pride or racial hatred.  The Catholic 
press went against the grain of other religious presses of Protestant origins that sought to display 
the Catholic identity of Mexico as a genitor of the weakness and inferiority of the Mexican 
people.  The Catholic Church to the Catholic press was the only source of stability, and as such, 
the source to bring about a cessation of hostilities during the War.  Moral reform groups also 
presented Mexicans in a negative light.  Members of temperance movements saw Mexico as a 
problem for U.S. society as they noted that their inclination toward alcohol, and had held views 
disparaging other races in the U.S. for their consumption of alcohol prior to the war.  Thus, for a 
majority of newspapers, the image of Mexico they espoused found support of the government 
after the war given the actions taken by the government of the United States and the people that 
would settle the American Southwest. 
 The people of Mexico, and now Mexican Americans, had begun their journey throughout 
the racialized world of the United States as racial others.  Their property rights were often 
neglected and their ability to vote was curtailed in order to preserve the Anglo-Saxon hegemony 
in the American Southwest.  Indeed, it had been the marriages between Spanish and the 
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indigenous populations in Mexico that had led to the birth of what some would chide them as the 
“mongrel” race of Mexicans.  This identity as half-Spanish, half Native American led to a future 
of confusion over their place amongst the other races in the United States.   It was this dual 
identity that led to Mexicans having to negotiate their position within American society, existing 
both in the shadow of their Spanish heritage and defined by their Indian identity.
240
   Thus, at the 
onset of their journey within the social confines of the United States, the Mexicans had to 
navigate as racial others and hope to establish themselves amongst the “white” races of the 
United States and gain political, economic, and social acceptance. 
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